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Picking the Brains of MPC Members

Author

Listed:
  • Apel, Mikael

    (Monetary Policy Department, Central Bank of Sweden)

  • Claussen, Carl Andreas

    (Monetary Policy Department, Central Bank of Sweden)

  • Lennartsdotter, Petra

    (Monetary Policy Department, Central Bank of Sweden)

Abstract

This paper reports and analyzes the results from a questionnaire sent to all present and former members of the Riksbank’s Executive Board, the monetary policy committee (MPC) of the Swedish central bank. The questions cover a number of issues discussed in the growing literature on monetary policy making by committees. The paper thus relates research to the views of practitioners in a way that has not been done before. We find, among other things, that many members consider the six-person strong Riksbank MPC to be slightly too large, that it is very common that members have decided before the policy meeting how they will vote, and that members, when forming their opinions, consider input from the staff more important than input from their colleagues.

Suggested Citation

  • Apel, Mikael & Claussen, Carl Andreas & Lennartsdotter, Petra, 2010. "Picking the Brains of MPC Members," Working Paper Series 237, Sveriges Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden).
  • Handle: RePEc:hhs:rbnkwp:0237
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    File URL: http://www.riksbank.com/upload/Dokument_riksbank/Kat_publicerat/WorkingPapers/2010/wp237.pdf
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Kedan, Danielle & Stuart, Rebecca, 2014. "Central Bank Communications: A Comparative Study," Quarterly Bulletin Articles, Central Bank of Ireland, pages 89-104, April.
    2. Mikael Apel & Carl Andreas Claussen & Petra Gerlach-Kristen & Petra Lennartsdotter & Øistein Røisland, 2013. "Monetary policy decisions – comparing theory and “inside” information from MPC members," Working Paper 2013/03, Norges Bank.
    3. Claussen, Carl Andreas & Matsen, Egil & Røisland, Øistein & Torvik, Ragnar, 2012. "Overconfidence, monetary policy committees and chairman dominance," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 699-711.
    4. Jakub Rybacki, 2020. "Are Central Banks’ Research Teams Fragile Because of Groupthink in the Area of Monetary Policy? – Evidence on Inflation Targeting," Gospodarka Narodowa. The Polish Journal of Economics, Warsaw School of Economics, issue 4, pages 81-103.
    5. David-Jan Jansen & Richhild Moessner, 2016. "Communicating dissent on monetary policy: Evidence from central bank minutes," DNB Working Papers 512, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
    6. Apel, Mikael & Blix Grimaldi, Marianna, 2012. "The Information Content of Central Bank Minutes," Working Paper Series 261, Sveriges Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden).
    7. Mikael Apel & Carl Andreas Claussen & Petra Lennartsdotter & Øistein Røisland, 2015. "Monetary Policy Committees: Comparing Theory and "Inside" Information from MPC Members," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 11(4), pages 47-89, December.
    8. Kedan, Danielle & Stuart, Rebecca, 2014. "Central Bank Minutes," Economic Letters 12/EL/14, Central Bank of Ireland.
    9. Firrell, Alastair & Reinold, Kate, 2020. "Uncertainty and voting on the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee," Bank of England working papers 898, Bank of England.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Monetary Policy Committee; Sveriges Riksbank; Questionnaire Study;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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