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Unfolding the Allegory behind Market Communication and Social Error and Correction

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Author Info
Klein, Daniel () (George Mason University, Ratio Institute)

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Abstract

Adam Smith’s moral theory considered a number of sources of moral approval and at each turn he invoked an accompanying spectator, however sketchy. In judging an action, at each turn we consult our sympathy with a spectator that is natural or proper to the occasion. In this paper I suggest that common economic talk of market communication, market error and correction, and policy error and correction similarly invokes such a spectatorial being and similarly appeals to our sympathy with such being. Behind such common economic talk, I suggest, are implicit allegories wherein an allegorical figure communicates knowledge, errs in its instructions, and corrects its instructions. The allegory behind such talk is vital and necessary because without it the talk of market communication, error, and correction cannot be sustained. Unfolding the allegory behind such theorizing helps to clarify the meaning, limitations, and value of such talk. Making what had been implicit explicit helps economists to avoid overstating their generalizations or making those generalizations sound more precise and accurate than they are. I explore the connections between the allegorical features and the doings of the economic agents. I suggest that the cogency of such economic theorizing depends on such correspondences, and that they are matters of culture, of both the context within which the theorizing is done and of the context theorized about. I suggest that there is a duality in Smith between the impartial spectator and the being with an invisible hand.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by The Ratio Institute in its series Ratio Working Papers with number 133.

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Length: 34 pages
Date of creation: 26 Mar 2009
Date of revision: 05 May 2009
Handle: RePEc:hhs:ratioi:0133

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Related research
Keywords: Market communication; price system; error; correction; coordination; Adam Smith; Friedrich Hayek; impartial spectator; invisible hand;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
A10 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - General
B10 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought through 1925 - - - General
B40 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology - - - General

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. von Hayek, Friedrich August, 1989. "The Pretence of Knowledge," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(6), pages 3-7, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Klein, Daniel B, 1999. " Discovery and the Deepself," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer, vol. 11(1-2), pages 47-76. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Armen A. Alchian, 1950. "Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58, pages 211. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-18.


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