Vad vet vi om kommunal korruption?
AbstractSince the mid 90´s there has been an increased focus in media on public scandals in Swedish municipalities. This essay sets out to eludicate if there are reasons to believe that public corruption in Swedish municipalities is in fact increasing. By applying instruments from the institutional rational-choice genre, and by illustrating the main argument with empirical illustrations, the author draws the conclusion that there are compelling reasons to believe that organizational reforms during the last two decades – i.e. new public management – have shaped an incentive-structure which favours corrupt actitivies, hence increasing their frequency. The author concludes with a discussion on reform-strategies to counteract increasing corruption, and calls for extensive research on this under-researched topic.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by The Ratio Institute in its series Ratio Working Papers with number 100.
Length: 38 pages
Date of creation: 29 May 2006
Date of revision:
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Postal: The Ratio Institute, P.O. Box 5095, SE-102 42 Stockholm, Sweden
Phone: 08-441 59 00
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Corruption; public scandals; institutional rational-choice; Swedish municipalities; New Public Management;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General
- H83 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Public Administration
- K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-06-10 (All new papers)
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