Does Belief in Ethical Subjectivism Pose a Challenge to Classical Liberalism?
AbstractClassical liberalism stresses the desirability of free markets, limited government and the rule of law. As such, it builds on some moral judgments. According to ethical objectivism, such judgments (in themselves always personal and subjective) can be true or false since objective moral facts exist against which the judgments can be assessed. Ethical subjectivism denies the existence of objective moral facts. This paper asks: Does it matter whether people believe that objective moral facts exist – in general and for a defense of classical liberalism? It is argued that the answer is in the negative. The implication for classical liberal strategy is that attempts to argue that a certain metaethical foundation is needed should be abandoned.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by The Ratio Institute in its series Ratio Working Papers with number 27.
Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: 19 Dec 2003
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Reason Papers, 2004, pages 69-86.
Contact details of provider:
Postal: The Ratio Institute, P.O. Box 5095, SE-102 42 Stockholm, Sweden
Phone: 08-441 59 00
Fax: 08-441 59 29
Web page: http://www.ratio.se/
More information through EDIRC
metaethics; liberalism; values;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- A13 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Social Values
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Berggren, Niclas, 2008.
"Choosing One’s Own Informal Institutions: On Hayek’s Critique of Keynes’s Immoralism,"
Ratio Working Papers
118, The Ratio Institute.
- Niclas Berggren, 2009. "Choosing one’s own informal institutions: on Hayek’s critique of Keynes’s immoralism," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 139-159, June.
- Niclas Berggren, 2006. "Legal positivism and property rights: a critique of Hayek and Peczenik," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 217-235, September.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Martin Korpi).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.