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Are nurses more altruistic than real estate brokers?

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Author Info

  • Jacobsen, Karin

    ()
    (Dept. of Economics, University of Oslo)

  • H. Eika, Kari

    (The Royal Ministry of Health and Care Services)

  • Helland, Leif

    (Department of Economics, BI Norwegian School of Management)

  • Thori Lind, Jo

    ()
    (Dept. of Economics, University of Oslo)

  • Nyborg, Karine

    ()
    (Dept. of Economics, University of Oslo)

Abstract

We report results from a dictator game experiment with nurse students and real estate broker students as dictators, and Amnesty International as the recipient. Although brokers contributed substantial amounts, nurses contributed significantly more, on average 76 percent of their endowment. In a second part, subjects chose between a certain repetition of the experiment and a 50-50 chance of costly exit. About one third of the brokers and half of the nurses chose the exit option. While generosity was indeed higher among nurses, even when taking exits into account, the difference cannot readily be attributed to different degrees of altruism.

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File URL: https://www.sv.uio.no/econ/english/research/unpublished-works/working-papers/pdf-files/2011/Memo-09-2011.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Oslo University, Department of Economics in its series Memorandum with number 09/2011.

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Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: 28 Apr 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:osloec:2011_009

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Postal: Department of Economics, University of Oslo, P.O Box 1095 Blindern, N-0317 Oslo, Norway
Phone: 22 85 51 27
Fax: 22 85 50 35
Email:
Web page: http://www.oekonomi.uio.no/indexe.html
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Keywords: Dictator game; exit option; generosity; occupational differences;

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Blog mentions

As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
  1. Are nurses more altruistic than real estate brokers?
    by Nicholas Gruen in Club Troppo on 2011-05-09 10:16:01
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Cited by:
  1. David Ong & Chun-Lei Yang, 2014. "Pro Bono Work and Trust in Expert Fields," CESifo Working Paper Series 4897, CESifo Group Munich.
  2. Fehrler, Sebastian & Kosfeld, Michael, 2012. "Pro-Social Missions and Worker Motivation: An Experimental Study," IZA Discussion Papers 6460, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  3. Tonin, Mirco & Vlassopoulos, Michael, 2013. "Experimental evidence of self-image concerns as motivation for giving," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 19-27.
  4. repec:noj:journl:v:38:y:2013:p:4 is not listed on IDEAS
  5. Astri Drange Hole, 2013. "How do economists differ from others in distributive situations?," Nordic Journal of Political Economy, Nordic Journal of Political Economy, Nordic Journal of Political Economy, vol. 38, pages 4.
  6. Robert Dur & Robin Zoutenbier, 2011. "Working for a Good Cause," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 11-168/1, Tinbergen Institute, revised 23 Apr 2013.
  7. Thorsten Chmura & Christoph Engel & Markus Englerth, 2013. "Selfishness As a Potential Cause of Crime. A Prison Experiment," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2013_05, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
  8. Khadjavi, Menusch & Lange, Andreas, 2013. "Prisoners and their dilemma," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 163-175.

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