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Moral Concerns on Tradable Pollution Permits in International Environmental Agreements

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  • Eyckmans, Johan

    ()
    (Hogeschool-Universiteit Brussel)

  • Kverndokk, Snorre

    ()
    (Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research)

Abstract

We investigate how moral concerns about permit trading affect an endogenous pollution permit trading equilibrium, where governments choose non-cooperatively the amount of permits they allocate to domestic industries. Politicians may feel reluctant to allow permit trading and/or may prefer that abatement is undertaken domestically due to moral concerns. This will have an effect on the initial permit allocations, and, therefore, on global emissions. The impact on global emissions depends on the precise formulation of the moral concerns, but under reasonable assumptions, we show that global emissions may increase. Thus, doing what is perceived as good does not always yield the desired outcome. However, this can be offset by restrictions on permit trading when governments have moral concerns about this trade.

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File URL: https://www.sv.uio.no/econ/english/research/unpublished-works/working-papers/pdf-files/2009/Memo-13-2009.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Oslo University, Department of Economics in its series Memorandum with number 13/2009.

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Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: 25 Jun 2009
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Ecological Economics, 2010, pages 1814-1823.
Handle: RePEc:hhs:osloec:2009_013

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Postal: Department of Economics, University of Oslo, P.O Box 1095 Blindern, N-0317 Oslo, Norway
Phone: 22 85 51 27
Fax: 22 85 50 35
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Web page: http://www.oekonomi.uio.no/indexe.html
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Related research

Keywords: Tradable emission permits; international environmental agreements; non-cooperative game theory; moral motivation; identity;

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References

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Cited by:
  1. Fuhai Hong & Susheng Wang, 2012. "Climate Policy, Learning, and Technology Adoption in Small Countries," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 51(3), pages 391-411, March.
  2. Anderson, Blake & M'Gonigle, Michael, 2012. "Does ecological economics have a future?," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 37-48.
  3. Birgit Bednar-Friedl, 2012. "Climate policy targets in emerging and industrialized economies: the influence of technological differences, environmental preferences and propensity to save," Empirica, Springer, vol. 39(2), pages 191-215, May.
  4. Dirk Rübbelke, 2011. "International Support of Climate Change Policies in Developing Countries: Strategic, Moral and Fairness Aspects," Working Papers 2011-02, BC3.
  5. Wu, Pei-Ing & Chen, Chai Tzu & Cheng, Pei-Ching & Liou, Je-Liang, 2014. "Climate game analyses for CO2 emission trading among various world organizations," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 441-446.
  6. Karen Pittel & Dirk Rübbelke, 2011. "International Climate Finance and its Influence on Fairness and Policy," Working Papers 2011-04, BC3.

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