Electricity prices in a mixed thermal and hydropower system
AbstractWhen a monopolistic hydro producer interacts with a competitive thermal fringe, the short-run revenue function of the hydro monopolist is non-concave. This implies that even if the demand function is stationary, equilibrium prices may fluctuate through the year. For given capacities, both hydro and thermal producers are better off under such an outcome than under the competitive outcome with constant prices, while consumers are worse off. Prices may fluctuate through the year also in the long-run equilibrium where capacities are endogenous. In such an equilibrium the hydropower monopoly will get a lower profit than it would have gotten had it been a price taker.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Oslo University, Department of Economics in its series Memorandum with number 28/2004.
Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: 29 Nov 2004
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, University of Oslo, P.O Box 1095 Blindern, N-0317 Oslo, Norway
Phone: 22 85 51 27
Fax: 22 85 50 35
Web page: http://www.oekonomi.uio.no/indexe.html
More information through EDIRC
Electricity prices; Hydropower;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
- Q25 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Water
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