Strategic Location with Asymmetric Transportation Costs
AbstractWe extend the classical Hotelling location game with exogenously fixed prices to the case where consumers' transportation costs are asymmetric, in the sence that it is more costly for consumer to move in one direction, say on the left (towards 0), than to move to the right (towards1).
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Oslo University, Department of Economics in its series Memorandum with number 35/1996.
Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: 1996
Date of revision:
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Postal: Department of Economics, University of Oslo, P.O Box 1095 Blindern, N-0317 Oslo, Norway
Phone: 22 85 51 27
Fax: 22 85 50 35
Web page: http://www.oekonomi.uio.no/indexe.html
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CONSUMPTION; PRICES; INDUSTRIAL LOCATION;
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- Nilssen, Tore, 1997.
"Sequential location when transportation costs are asymmetric,"
Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 191-201, February.
- Nilssen, T., 1996. "Sequential Location when Transportation Costs Are Asymmetric," Memorandum 36/1996, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
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