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Should a Carbon Tax Be Differentiated Across Sectors?

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Abstract

If some, but not all, countries are cooperating to reduce CO2 emissions, it can be argued that: A high carbon tax on carbon-intensive tradable sectors in the cooperating countries will reduce the production of goods from these sectors, and therefore CO2 emissions, in those countries. This will to a large extent be counteracted by increased production of such goods in the countries which have no such policy, however. Since it is total CO2 emissions from all countries which is relevant for the climate, there is little advantage in a policy which simply shifts CO2 emissions from the cooperating countries to other countries. Carbon-intensive tradable sectors should thus face a lower carbon tax than other sectors of the economy.The paper shows that a carbon tax should not be differentiated across sectors in the economy, provided import and export tariffs can be used on all traded goods. It is also shown that such a differentiation of carbon taxes is optimal for the cooperating countries if they are prevented from using tariffs on the traded goods. Informational or political factors constraining the use of tariffs are also likely to constrain the possibility of differentiating carbon taxes between sectors, however.
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Suggested Citation

  • Hoel, M., 1993. "Should a Carbon Tax Be Differentiated Across Sectors?," Memorandum 1993_009, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:hhs:osloec:1993_009
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Torvanger, A., 1993. "Efficient Contracts in a Game of Nations Pursuing Greenhouse Gas Emissions Abatement," Memorandum 1993_003, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
    2. Michael Hoel, 1992. "International environment conventions: The case of uniform reductions of emissions," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 2(2), pages 141-159, March.
    3. Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1993. "Strategies for the international protection of the environment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 309-328, October.
    4. Barrett, Scott, 1994. "Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(0), pages 878-894, Supplemen.
    5. James R. MARKUSEN, 2021. "International Externalities And Optimal Tax Structures," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: BROADENING TRADE THEORY Incorporating Market Realities into Traditional Models, chapter 16, pages 341-355, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    air pollution ; oil industry;

    JEL classification:

    • F02 - International Economics - - General - - - International Economic Order and Integration
    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy
    • Q48 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Government Policy

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