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Pay-As-You-Speed: An Economic Field-Experiment

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Author Info
Hultkrantz, Lars () (Department of Business, Economics, Statistics and Informatics)
Lindberg, Gunnar (Statens väg- och transportforskningsinstitut, VTI)
Abstract

We report a vehicle-fleet experiment with an economic incentive given to car drivers for keeping within speed limits. A pay-as-you-speed traffic insurance scheme was simulated with a monthly participation bonus that was reduced by a non-linear speeding penalty. Actual speed was monitored by a GPS in-vehicle device. Participating drivers were randomly assigned into two-by two treatment groups, with different participation-bonus and penalty levels, and two control groups (high and low participation bonus, but no penalty). A third control group consists of drivers with the same technical equipment who did not participate but whose driving could be monitored. We evaluate changes in behaviour from twelve-month differences in proportion of driving time per month that the car was exceeding the maximum allowed speed on the road. We find that the participating drivers significantly reduced severe speeding violations during the first experiment month, while in the second experiment month, after having received feedback reports with an account of earned payments, only those participating subjects that were given a speeding penalty reduced severe speed violations. We find no significant effects from the size of the participation bonus (high vs. low), or the size of the penalty (high vs. low rate).

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Örebro University, Swedish Business School in its series Working Papers with number 2009:12.

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Length: 37 pages
Date of creation: 25 Aug 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:oruesi:2009_012

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Postal: Örebro University, Swedish Business School, SE - 701 82 ÖREBRO, Sweden
Phone: 019-30 30 00
Fax: 019-33 25 46
Web page: http://www.oru.se/templates/oruExtDeptIntroPage.aspx?id=3059
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Related research
Keywords: Traffic insurance; traffic safety; Intelligent Transport Systems; ITS; Intelligent Speed Adaptation; ISA;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
R41 - Urban, Rural, and Regional Economics - - Transportation Systems - - - Transportation: Demand, Supply, and Congestion

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. de Meza, David & Webb, David C, 2001. "Advantageous Selection in Insurance Markets," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(2), pages 249-62, Summer.
    Other versions:
  2. Hemenway, David, 1990. "Propitious Selection," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 105(4), pages 1063-69, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Shogren, Jason F. & Crocker, Thomas D., 1991. "Risk, self-protection, and ex ante economic value," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 1-15, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Gunnar Lindberg, 2001. "Traffic Insurance and Accident Externality Charges," Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, London School of Economics and University of Bath, vol. 35(3), pages 399-416, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-17.


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