Voluntary road pricing
AbstractIn voluntary programs that encourage social responsible (“safe”, “green”, or whatever) driving, it is possible to implement pricing schemes that more closely reflect the variation of the social marginal cost of driving than can be made with regular (more uniform) taxes and charges. This paper discusses motives for such programs and presents three examples: pay-as-you-drive car insurance, “economic” intelligent speed adaptation, and urban city driving guidance with automatic booking and payment of parking and/or road use charges.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Örebro University, School of Business in its series Working Papers with number 2004:5.
Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: 29 Sep 2004
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Örebro University School of Business, SE - 701 82 ÖREBRO, Sweden
Phone: 019-30 30 00
Fax: 019-33 25 46
Web page: http://www.oru.se/Institutioner/Handelshogskolan-vid-Orebro-universitet/
More information through EDIRC
congestion; traffic safety; economic incentives; road tolls; pay-as-you-drive; intelligent speed adaptation; intelligent transport systems; telematics;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
- H54 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Infrastructures
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- Gunnar Lindberg & Lars Hultkrantz & Jan-Eric Nilsson & Fridtjof Thomas, 2005. "Pay-as-you-speed: Two field experiments on controlling adverse selection and moral hazard in traffic insurance," Framed Field Experiments 00170, The Field Experiments Website.
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