Stensholt, Eivind () (Dept. of Finance and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration)
Abstract
A very close link of G-S, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem to Arrow’s "impossibility" theorem is shown. G-S is derived as a corollary: from a strategy-proof singleseat election method F is constructed an election method G that contradicts Arrow’s theorem.
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Department of Finance and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration in its series Discussion Papers with number
2008/12.
Length: 3 pages Date of creation: 12 Jun 2008 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:hhs:nhhfms:2008_012
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Find related papers by JEL classification: D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
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