Cycles and Third-Party Payments in the Partnership Formation Problem
AbstractWe characterize the core of the partnership formation problem (Talman and Yang, Journal of Mathematical Economics 47, 2011) using cycles in the solution of a linear programming problem. The cycles also lead us to a new and intuitive sufficient condition for the existence of equilibrium, generalizing known results. We then introduce the partnership-stable equilibrium, a weakened solution concept in the sense that each equilibrium is also a partnership-stable equilibrium, and find sufficient and necessary conditions for its existence. Finally, we conduct a simulation study to see how often existence is an issue and which factors affect the rate at which problems have solutions.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Lund University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2013:16.
Length: 19 pages
Date of creation: 30 May 2013
Date of revision:
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Postal: Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University, Box 7082, S-220 07 Lund,Sweden
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Partnership; equilibrium; linear programming; cycles; third-party payments;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations
- D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
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- Andersson , Tommy & Gudmundsson , Jens & Talman , Adolphus & Yang , Zaifu, 2013.
"A Competitive Partnership Formation Process,"
2013:2, Lund University, Department of Economics.
- Andersson, T. & Gudmundsson, J. & Talman, A.J.J. & Yang, Z., 2013. "A Competitive Partnership Formation Process," Discussion Paper 2013-008, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Tommy Andersson & Jens Gudmundsson & Dolf Talman & Zaifu Yang, 2013. "A Competitive Partnership Formation Process," Discussion Papers 13/04, Department of Economics, University of York.
- Gudmundsson, Jens, 2013. "A Review of the Existence of Stable Roommate Matchings," Working Papers 2013:8, Lund University, Department of Economics.
- Talman, Dolf & Yang, Zaifu, 2011.
"A model of partnership formation,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 206-212, March.
- Chung, Kim-Sau, 2000. "On the Existence of Stable Roommate Matchings," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 206-230, November.
- Bettina Klaus & Alexandru Nichifor, 2010. "Consistency in one-sided assignment problems," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 35(3), pages 415-433, September.
- Johan Karlander & Kimmo Eriksson, 2001. "Stable outcomes of the roommate game with transferable utility," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 29(4), pages 555-569.
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