Imperfect Tagging Revisited
AbstractRevisiting Parsons' 1996 article about disability insurance with imperfect tagging in a two type-economy -- individuals are either able or disabled. Here Parsons' analysis is extended in several directions. The model is generalized to allow for different utility functions over work status. The analysis extends to three different cases of a two-type economy. Finally Parsons' model is extended to three types: able, partially disabled and disabled - adapting the model to disability insurances allowing for more than two degrees of disability. The results are consistent with Parsons', but a complete ranking of the consumption allocations cannot be achieved in the general case.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Lund University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2007:2.
Length: 36 pages
Date of creation: 19 Feb 2007
Date of revision:
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Postal: Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University, Box 7082, S-220 07 Lund,Sweden
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More information through EDIRC
social insurance; imperfect tagging; partial disability;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- H53 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-02-24 (All new papers)
- NEP-IAS-2007-02-24 (Insurance Economics)
- NEP-PBE-2007-02-24 (Public Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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