Shackling the footloose firm? Factor interests and majority voting
AbstractAdding majority voting to a simple new economic geography model, we analyse under which circumstances politically determined barriers to international firm relocation exist. Two countries, differing in market size, consider abolishing restrictions on firm mobility. Eliminating these restrictions will fully or partially de-industrialize the small country as firms relocate to the larger market. We show that there is unanimous support for (resistance against) the removal of obstacles to firm relocation in the large (small) country if the country size difference is small, while a large difference in size gives rise to domestic conflicts of interest and international cross-factor alignments of interests. Furthermore, trade liberalisation may have facilitated the removal of barriers to firm relocation in large countries. Finally, political integration between trading countries is likely to contribute to the removal of barriers to firm relocation, and support for (resistance against) such a development comes primarily from the immobile factor in the large (small) country.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Lund University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2006:16.
Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: 11 Aug 2006
Date of revision:
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More information through EDIRC
barriers to firm relocation; new economic geography; majority voting; public policy;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
- F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
- F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-08-26 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2006-08-26 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2006-08-26 (Positive Political Economics)
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