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Evolutionary Dynamics and a Refinement of the Neutral Stability Criterion

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Author Info
Torstensson, Pär () (Department of Economics, Lund University)
Abstract

We introduce two refinements of the neutral stability criterion, namely the ascending and the eroding neutrally stable strategies (NSS). These criteria take into account how well the NSS preform against all pure strategies in symmetric two-player games. We also present a dynamic model which supports the refinements.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Lund University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2005:37.

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Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: 10 May 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2005_037

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Postal: Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University, Box 7082, S-220 07 Lund,Sweden
Phone: +46 +46 222 0000
Fax: +46 +46 2224613
Web page: http://www.nek.lu.se/
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Related research
Keywords: Evolutionary dynamics; Neutrally stable strategies; ascending NSS; Eroding NSS.;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

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  1. Samuelson, L. & Zhang, J., 1991. "Evolutionary Stability in Asymmetric Games," Papers 9132, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
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  2. Bomze Immanuel M. & Burger Reinhard, 1995. "Stability by Mutation in Evolutionary Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 146-172, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Binmore, K. & Samuelson, L., 1990. "Evolutionary Stability In Repeated Games Played By Finite Automata," Working papers 90-29, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    Other versions:
  4. Oechssler, Jorg & Riedel, Frank, 2002. "On the Dynamic Foundation of Evolutionary Stability in Continuous Models," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 223-252, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Bomze Immanuel M. & Weibull Jorgen W., 1995. "Does Neutral Stability Imply Lyapunov Stability?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 173-192, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. repec:att:wimass:199325 is not listed on IDEAS
  7. Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J & Rob, Rafael, 1993. "Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 29-56, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Binmore, Kenneth G. & Samuelson, Larry, 1992. "Evolutionary stability in repeated games played by finite automata," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 278-305, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Boylan Richard T., 1994. "Evolutionary Equilibria Resistant to Mutation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 10-34, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Hammerstein, Peter & Selten, Reinhard, 1994. "Game theory and evolutionary biology," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 28, pages 929-993 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Swinkels, Jeroen M., 1992. "Evolutionary stability with equilibrium entrants," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 306-332, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Boylan, Richard., 1990. "Equilibria Resistant to Mutation," Working Papers 729, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  13. Samuelson, Larry & Zhang, Jianbo, 1992. "Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 363-391, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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