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The German 3G Licence Auction: Did the Government's Stake in Deutsche Telekom Influence the Outcome?

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Author Info
Rander, Robin () (Department of Economics, Lund University)
Abstract

The spectrum for third generation (3G) mobile communications for the German market was alloted to operators by means of an auction. This resulted in a highly competitive outcome: six operators were given rights to provide 3G services. Government revenues from this auction were a staggering EUR 50.8 Bn. As the German government stands as majority shareholder in one of the strongest participants, Deutsche Telekom (DT), it was argued that DT had an incentive to push prices to higher levels than had otherwise been motivated, thereby servicing the interest of the majority shareholder. This paper provides a theoretical model which shows that the German auction rules were indeed vulnerable to such a conflict of interests. However, the only equilibrium of the model consistent with observed behaviour corresponds to a conflict of interest (in the context of the model) too small to have any impact on the behaviour of DT.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Lund University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2004:15.

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Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: 14 Apr 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2004_015

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Postal: Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University, Box 7082, S-220 07 Lund,Sweden
Phone: +46 +46 222 0000
Fax: +46 +46 2224613
Web page: http://www.nek.lu.se/
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Related research
Keywords: Auction theory Telecommunications Game theory Toe hold

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
D45 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Rationing; Licensing
H82 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Governmental Property
L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Jehiel, Philippe & Moldovanu, Benny, 2000. "License Auctions and Market Structure," CEPR Discussion Papers 2530, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Gilbert, Richard J & Newbery, David M G, 1982. "Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of Monopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(3), pages 514-26, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Philippe Jehiel & Benny Moldovanu, 1996. "Strategic Nonparticipation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(1), pages 84-98, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
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