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Generosity and Political Preferences

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Author Info

  • Dawes, Christopher T.

    (Department of Politics)

  • Johannesson, Magnus

    (Stockholm School of Economics)

  • Lindqvist, Erik

    ()
    (Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN))

  • Loewen, Peter

    (Department of Political Science)

  • Östling, Robert

    (Institute for International Economic Studies)

  • Bonde, Marianne
  • Priks, Frida

Abstract

We test whether generosity is related to political preferences and partisanship in Canada, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States using incentivized dictator games. The total sample consists of more than 5,000 respondents. We document that support for social spending and redistribution is positively correlated with generosity in all four countries. Further, we show that donors are more generous towards co-partisans in all countries, and that this effect is stronger among supporters of left-wing political parties. All results are robust to the inclusion to an extensive set of control variables, including income and education.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Research Institute of Industrial Economics in its series Working Paper Series with number 941.

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Length: 46 pages
Date of creation: 21 Nov 2012
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0941

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Postal: Research Institute of Industrial Economics, Box 55665, SE-102 15 Stockholm, Sweden
Phone: +46 8 665 4500
Fax: +46 8 665 4599
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Web page: http://www.ifn.se/
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Related research

Keywords: Generosity; Altruism; Political Preferences; Size of Government; Public Goods; Dictator Game; Ingroup Effect; Political Partisanship;

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References

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  1. David Cesarini & Christopher T. Dawes & Magnus Johannesson & Paul Lichtenstein & Björn Wallace, 2009. "Genetic Variation in Preferences for Giving and Risk Taking," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 124(2), pages 809-842, May.
  2. Lisa R. Anderson & Jennifer M. Mellor & Jeffrey Milyo, 2004. "Do Liberals Play Nice? The Effects of Party and Political Ideology in Public Goods and Trust Games," Working Papers 07, Department of Economics, College of William and Mary.
  3. Elinder, Mikael & Jordahl , Henrik & Poutvaara, Panu, 2008. "Selfish and Prospective Theory and Evidence of Pocketbook Voting," Working Paper Series 2008:7, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
  4. Austen-Smith, David, 1984. "Two-party competition with many constituences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 177-198, April.
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Blog mentions

As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
  1. Generosity and Political Preferences
    by Nicholas Gruen in Club Troppo on 2012-12-24 14:44:22
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Cited by:
  1. Byung-Yeon Kim & Syngjoo Choi & Jungmin Lee & Sokbae 'Simon' Lee & Kyunghui Choi, 2013. "Do institutions affect social preferences? Evidence from divided Korea," CeMMAP working papers CWP35/13, Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice, Institute for Fiscal Studies.

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