Generosity and Political Preferences
AbstractWe test whether generosity is related to political preferences and partisanship in Canada, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States using incentivized dictator games. The total sample consists of more than 5,000 respondents. We document that support for social spending and redistribution is positively correlated with generosity in all four countries. Further, we show that donors are more generous towards co-partisans in all countries, and that this effect is stronger among supporters of left-wing political parties. All results are robust to the inclusion to an extensive set of control variables, including income and education.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Research Institute of Industrial Economics in its series Working Paper Series with number 941.
Length: 46 pages
Date of creation: 21 Nov 2012
Date of revision:
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Generosity; Altruism; Political Preferences; Size of Government; Public Goods; Dictator Game; Ingroup Effect; Political Partisanship;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
- H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-12-15 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2012-12-15 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EUR-2012-12-15 (Microeconomic European Issues)
- NEP-EXP-2012-12-15 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-PBE-2012-12-15 (Public Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2012-12-15 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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