Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

The Permissible Reach of National Environmental Policies

Contents:

Author Info

  • Horn, Henrik

    ()
    (Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN))

  • Mavroidis, Petros C.

    (Columbia Law School, New York)

Abstract

Trading nations exchange tariff concessions in the context of trade liberalizing rounds. Tariffs, nonetheless, are not the only instrument affecting the value of a concession. Domestic instruments affect it as well, but public order is not negotiable, and, consequently, is not scheduled. Public order is unilaterally defined, but must respect the default rules concerning allocation of jurisdiction which are common to all WTO Members and bind them by virtue of their appurtenance to the international community. In this paper, we focus on the interaction between trade and environment. The purpose of this study is to highlight how these rules and the GATT/WTO jointly determine the scope for unilateral environmental policies for WTO Members. In the study we examine the relevant multilateral framework dealing with this issue, as well as the relevant GATT and WTO case-law. We also briefly present the jurisdictional default rules in Public International Law. As a means of focusing the discussion, we consider a series of scenarios, partly building on factual aspects of cases that have already been brought before the WTO. These scenarios are intended to isolate issues of specific interest from a policy point of view. For each scenario we then seek to determine what would the outcome be, in case WTO adjudicating bodies were to explicitly take account of the default rules concerning allocation of jurisdiction, something which has not been done to date. Our main conclusions are two-fold: on occasion, the outcome would be different, had WTO panels observed the default rules concerning allocation of jurisdiction; more generally, the default rules can help us understand the limits of some key obligations assumed under the WTO. Crucially, absent recourse to the default rules concerning allocation of jurisdiction, one risks understanding non-discrimination (the key GATT-obligation) as an instrument aimed to harmonize conditions of competition across markets, and not within markets, as the intent of negotiators has always been.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.ifn.se/Wfiles/wp/wp739.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Research Institute of Industrial Economics in its series Working Paper Series with number 739.

as in new window
Length: 133 pages
Date of creation: 02 Apr 2008
Date of revision: 20 Jun 2008
Publication status: Published in Journal of World Trade, 2009, pages 1108-1178.
Handle: RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0739

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Research Institute of Industrial Economics, Box 55665, SE-102 15 Stockholm, Sweden
Phone: +46 8 665 4500
Fax: +46 8 665 4599
Email:
Web page: http://www.ifn.se/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Trade and Environment; WTO;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Henrik Horn, 2006. "National Treatment in the GATT," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 394-404, March.
  2. Steve Charnovitz, 2007. "The WTO's Environmental Progress," Journal of International Economic Law, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(3), pages 685-706, September.
  3. Henrik Horn & Giovanni Maggi & Robert W. Staiger, 2010. "Trade Agreements as Endogenously Incomplete Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(1), pages 394-419, March.
  4. Grossman, Gene M. & Sykes, Alan O., 2005. "A preference for development: the law and economics of GSP," World Trade Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 4(01), pages 41-67, March.
  5. Alvin K. Klevorick & Alan O. Sykes, 2007. "United States Courts and the Optimal Deterrence of International Cartels: A Welfarist Perspective on Empagran," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1617, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  6. Alvin K Klevorick & Alan O Sykes, 2007. "United States Courts and the Optimal Deterrence of International Cartels: A Welfarist Perspective on Empagran," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000307, UCLA Department of Economics.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/5l6uh8ogmqildh09h2q83h42k is not listed on IDEAS
  2. Horn, Henrik & Mavroidis, Petros C., 2009. "Burden of Proof in Environmental Disputes in the WTO: Legal Aspects," Working Paper Series 793, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
  3. Horn, Henrik, 2009. "The Burden of Proof in National Treatment Disputes and the Environment," CEPR Discussion Papers 7316, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. Patrick Messerlin, 2010. "Climate change and trade policy: From mutual destruction to mutual support," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/5l6uh8ogmqi, Sciences Po.
  5. Patrick Messerlin, 2012. "Climate and trade policies: from mutual destruction to mutual support," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/faqom67ai2q, Sciences Po.
  6. Horn, Henrik, 2011. "The burden of proof in trade disputes and the environment," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 15-29, July.
  7. Henrik HORN & Petros C. MAVROIDIS, 2011. "To B(TA) or not to B(TA)? On the Legality and Desirability of Border Tax Adjustments from a Trade Perspective," Working Papers P21, FERDI.
  8. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/faqom67ai2qsojk9j15c04u8j is not listed on IDEAS
  9. Patrick MESSERLIN, 2011. "Climate, trade and water: A “grand coalition”?," Working Papers P23, FERDI.
  10. Grossman, Gene M. & Horn, Henrik & Mavroidis, Petros C., 2012. "The Legal and Economic Principles of World Trade Law: National Treatment," Working Paper Series 917, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
  11. Patrick MESSERLIN, 2011. "Climate, trade and water: A “grand coalition”?," Working Papers P23, FERDI.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0739. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Elisabeth Gustafsson).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.