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Bargaining over a New Welfare State

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Author Info
Bonatti , Alessandro (Yale University)
Thomsson, Kaj () (Yale University)
Abstract

The goal of this paper is twofold: First, to develop an estimable model of legislative politics in the US Congress, second, to provide a greater understanding of the objectives behind the New Deal. In the theoretical model, the distribution of federal funds across regions of the country is the outcome of bargaining game in which the President acts as the agenda-setter and Congress bargains over the final shape of the spending bill. For any given preferences (of the President) and distribution of seats in Congress, the model delivers a unique predicted allocation. Combined with data on New Deal programs, this is used to estimate the objectives of the Roosevelt administration. The results indicate that economic concerns for relief and recovery, though not necessarily for fundamental reform and development, largely drove New Deal spending. Political concerns also mattered, but more on the margin.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Research Institute of Industrial Economics in its series Working Paper Series with number 713.

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Length: 36 pages
Date of creation: 16 Oct 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0713

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Related research
Keywords: Political Economy LegislativeBargaining New Deal US Congress Public Spending

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
H50 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - General
N42 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, and Regulation - - - U.S.; Canada: 1913-
P48 - Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Other Economic Systems: Political Economy; Legal Institutions; Property Rights

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