Immediate Agreement in Interdependent Bilateral Bargaining
AbstractThis note provides sufficient conditions for immediate agreement in an extensive form model of interdependent bilateral bargaining. The model is suggested by Björnerstedt and Stennek (2006) as a work horse for studying bilateral oligopoly. The key feature of this model is that the firms are represented by separate agents in all negotiations in which they are involved. There is immediate agreement in equilibrium, essentially if production is strictly convex or if the agents use Markov strategies.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Research Institute of Industrial Economics in its series Working Paper Series with number 692.
Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: 25 Jan 2007
Date of revision:
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Bilateral Oligopoly; Intermediate Goods; Bargaining; Market Network; Trade Link;
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- D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - General
- L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General
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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-02-24 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2007-02-24 (Business Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2007-02-24 (Game Theory)
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