Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

The Effects of Internationalization on CEO Compensation

Contents:

Author Info

  • Oxelheim, Lars

    ()
    (The Research Institute of Industrial Economics)

  • Randoy, Trond

    (Agder University College and Agder Research)

Abstract

This study examines the relation between the internationalization of firms and CEO compensation. Starting from a sample of Norwegian and Swedish listed firms we analyze the effects of internationalization as manifest in the capital market (international cross-listing), the market for corporate control (foreign board membership), and the product and service market (export and foreign sales). We conclude that all three markets contribute positively to the compensation level of CEOs. We argue that part of the higher CEO compensation in internationally oriented firms - as compared to less internationalized firms within the same country - reflects a risk premium for reduction in job security.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.ifn.se/Wfiles/wp/WP611.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Research Institute of Industrial Economics in its series Working Paper Series with number 611.

as in new window
Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: 09 Feb 2004
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Journal of International Business Studies, 2005, pages 470-483.
Handle: RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0611

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Research Institute of Industrial Economics, Box 55665, SE-102 15 Stockholm, Sweden
Phone: +46 8 665 4500
Fax: +46 8 665 4599
Email:
Web page: http://www.ifn.se/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: CEO Compensation; Internationalization; Corporate Governance; CEO Tenure; Cross-Listing; Foreign Board Membership;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 1998. "Corporate Ownership Around the World," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1840, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  2. Farok J Contractor & Sumit K Kundu & Chin-Chun Hsu, 2003. "A three-stage theory of international expansion: the link between multinationality and performance in the service sector," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 34(1), pages 5-18, January.
  3. Doidge, Craig & Karolyi, G. Andrew & Stulz, Rene M., 2004. "Why are foreign firms listed in the U.S. worth more?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 205-238, February.
  4. Murphy, Kevin J., 2000. "Performance standards in incentive contracts," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 245-278, December.
  5. Morck, Randall & Yeung, Bernard, 1991. "Why Investors Value Multinationality," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64(2), pages 165-87, April.
  6. Oxelheim, Lars & Randoy, Trond, 2003. "The impact of foreign board membership on firm value," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(12), pages 2369-2392, December.
  7. Yermack, David, 1996. "Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 185-211, February.
  8. Michael C. Jensen, 2010. "The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 22(1), pages 43-58.
  9. Fama, Eugene F, 1980. "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(2), pages 288-307, April.
  10. Core, John E. & Holthausen, Robert W. & Larcker, David F., 1999. "Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 371-406, March.
  11. Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, 1998. "Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 113(3), pages 653-691, August.
  12. Jensen, M.C. & Murphy, K.J., 1988. "Performance Pay And Top Management Incentives," Papers 88-04, Rochester, Business - Managerial Economics Research Center.
  13. Weisbach, Michael S., 1988. "Outside directors and CEO turnover," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 431-460, January.
  14. Miller, Darius P., 1999. "The market reaction to international cross-listings:: evidence from Depositary Receipts," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 103-123, January.
  15. Howe, John S. & Madura, Jeff, 1990. "The impact of international listings on risk : Implications for capital market integration," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 14(6), pages 1133-1142, December.
  16. Robert M Grant, 1987. "Multinationality and Performance among British Manufacturing Companies," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 18(3), pages 79-89, September.
  17. repec:fth:michin:282 is not listed on IDEAS
  18. Gary S. Becker, 1975. "Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, with Special Reference to Education, 2nd ed," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number beck75-1.
  19. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 301-25, June.
  20. David M Reeb & Chuck C Y Kwok & H Young Baek, 1998. "Systematic Risk of the Multinational Corporation," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 29(2), pages 263-279, June.
  21. Marco Becht & Fabrizio Barca, 2001. "The control of corporate Europe," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/13302, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Vicente Cuñat & Maria Guadalupe, 2005. "How does product market competition shape incentive contracts?," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 19894, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0611. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Elisabeth Gustafsson).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.