The Effects of Internationalization on CEO Compensation
AbstractThis study examines the relation between the internationalization of firms and CEO compensation. Starting from a sample of Norwegian and Swedish listed firms we analyze the effects of internationalization as manifest in the capital market (international cross-listing), the market for corporate control (foreign board membership), and the product and service market (export and foreign sales). We conclude that all three markets contribute positively to the compensation level of CEOs. We argue that part of the higher CEO compensation in internationally oriented firms - as compared to less internationalized firms within the same country - reflects a risk premium for reduction in job security.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Research Institute of Industrial Economics in its series Working Paper Series with number 611.
Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: 09 Feb 2004
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Journal of International Business Studies, 2005, pages 470-483.
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Research Institute of Industrial Economics, Box 55665, SE-102 15 Stockholm, Sweden
Phone: +46 8 665 4500
Fax: +46 8 665 4599
Web page: http://www.ifn.se/
More information through EDIRC
CEO Compensation; Internationalization; Corporate Governance; CEO Tenure; Cross-Listing; Foreign Board Membership;
Other versions of this item:
- Oxelheim, Lars & Randøy, Trond, 2002. "The Effect of Internationalization On CEO-Compensation," Working Paper Series 2002/4, Lund University, Institute of Economic Research.
- G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
- K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law
- M10 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Business Administration - - - General
- M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executive Compensation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-11-19 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2005-11-19 (Business Economics)
- NEP-FIN-2005-11-19 (Finance)
- NEP-LAW-2005-11-19 (Law & Economics)
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