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Institutions for the Selection of Entrepreneurs: Implications for Economic Growth and Financial Crises

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  • Pelikan, Pavel

    (The Research Institute of Industrial Economics)

Abstract

The search for growth-promoting policies is found to demand knowledge of how growth depends upon actions of entrepreneurs and how these actions depend upon the prevailing institutions. While institutions have extensively been examined for their influences upon the freedoms and the incentives of entrepreneurs, and thereby upon the level of employment of resources, this paper examines their influences upon the selection of entrepreneurs, and thereby upon the efficiency of that employment. This selection is crucial in the realistic but in theory seldom considered cases in which all agents, including entrepreneurs, may differ in economic abilities. A simple model shows that in the long run, selection by market competition, especially when extended to financial markets, vastly outperforms selection controlled or protected politically. Such selection may outperform market selection only during a limited period, extendable only at the price of growing bad debts and financial crises.

Suggested Citation

  • Pelikan, Pavel, 1999. "Institutions for the Selection of Entrepreneurs: Implications for Economic Growth and Financial Crises," Working Paper Series 510, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, revised 15 Feb 2000.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:0510
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Pelikan, Pavel, 1997. "Allocation of Economic Competence in Teams: A Comparative Institutional Analysis," Working Paper Series 480, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    2. Pelikan, Pavel, 1989. "Evolution, economic competence, and the market for corporate control," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 279-303, December.
    3. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 737-783, June.
    4. Pranab Bardhan & John E. Roemer, 1992. "Market Socialism: A Case for Rejuvenation," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 6(3), pages 101-116, Summer.
    5. Armen A. Alchian, 1950. "Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58, pages 211-211.
    6. Kevin M. Murphy & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1991. "The Allocation of Talent: Implications for Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 106(2), pages 503-530.
    7. repec:hhs:iuiwop:480 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Barberis, Nicholas & Maxim Boycko & Andrei Shleifer & Natalia Tsukanova, 1996. "How Does Privatization Work? Evidence from the Russian Shops," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(4), pages 764-790, August.
    9. Sidney G. Winter, 1971. "Satisficing, Selection, and the Innovating Remnant," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 85(2), pages 237-261.
    10. Gorton, Gary & Winton, Andrew, 1998. "Banking in Transition Economies: Does Efficiency Require Instability?," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 30(3), pages 621-650, August.
    11. Pelikan, Pavel, 1989. "Evolution, Economic Competence, and the Market for Corporate Control," Working Paper Series 215, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    12. Raaj K. Sah & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1991. "The Quality of Managers in Centralized Versus Decentralized Organizations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 106(1), pages 289-295.
    13. Pavel Pelikan, 1993. "Ownership of firms and efficiency: The competence argument," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 4(3), pages 349-392, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Eonomic growth; growth-promoting policies; institutions; economic abilities; entrepreneurs; investors; voters; market selection; government selection; financial markets; financial crises;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D90 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - General
    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • G10 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - General (includes Measurement and Data)
    • O10 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - General
    • O40 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - General
    • P51 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems - - - Comparative Analysis of Economic Systems

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