A Continuous Theory of Income Insurance
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Other versions of this item:
- Assar Lindbeck & Mats Persson, 2010. "A Continuous Theory of Income Insurance," CESifo Working Paper Series 3097, CESifo.
- Lindbeck, Assar & Persson, Mats, 2010. "A Continuous Theory of Income Insurance," Working Paper Series 840, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
References listed on IDEAS
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Per Johansson & Erica Lindahl, 2013.
"Can sickness absence be affected by information meetings? Evidence from a social experiment,"
Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 44(3), pages 1673-1695, June.
- Johansson, Per & Lindahl, Erica, 2010. "Can sickness absence be affected by information meetings? Evidence from a social experiment," Working Paper Series 2010:11, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
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More about this item
Keywords
moral hazard; disability insurance; sick pay; work absence; social norms;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
- H53 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
- I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
- J20 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - General
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