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The Becker Paradox and Type I vs. Type II Errors in the Economics of Crime

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Author Info
Persson, Mats () (Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm University)
Siven, Claes-Henric () (Department of Economics)
Abstract

Two real-world observations are not easily replicated in models of crime. First, although capital punishment is optimal in Becker’s (1968) model, it is rarely observed in the real world. Second, criminal procedure and the evaluation of evidence vary across societies and historical periods, the standard of proof being sometimes very high and sometimes quite low. In this paper, we develop a general equilibrium model of judicial procedure allowing for innocent persons being convicted. We show that the median voter theorem applies to this model, making judicial procedure endogenous. So formulated, the model can replicate both empirical observations.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies in its series Seminar Papers with number 741.

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Length: 36 pages
Date of creation: 01 Jan 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:iiessp:0741

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Postal: Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm University, S-106 91 Stockholm, Sweden
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Related research
Keywords: Criminal law; Judicial error; Burden of proof;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General

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  1. David Friedman, 1999. "Why Not Hang Them All: The Virtues of Inefficient Punishment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(S6), pages S259-S269, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1997. "Political Economics and Macroeconomic Policy," CEPR Discussion Papers 1759, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Murphy, Kevin M & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1993. "Why Is Rent-Seeking So Costly to Growth?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(2), pages 409-14, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Png, I. P. L., 1986. "Optimal subsidies and damages in the presence of judicial error," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 101-105, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, 1994. "Accuracy in the Determination of Liability," NBER Working Papers 4203, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Stigler, George J, 1970. "The Optimum Enforcement of Laws," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(3), pages 526-36, May-June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Sah, Raaj K, 1991. "Social Osmosis and Patterns of Crime," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(6), pages 1272-95, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Harris, John R, 1970. "On the Economics of Law and Order," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(1), pages 165-74, Jan.-Feb.. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Jesper Roine, 2006. "The political economics of not paying taxes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 126(1), pages 107-134, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Kenneth Burdett & Ricardo Lagos & Randall Wright, 2003. "Crime, Inequality, and Unemployment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(5), pages 1764-1777, December. [Downloadable!]
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  11. Chien-Chieh Huang & Derek Laing & Ping Wang, 2004. "Crime And Poverty: A Search-Theoretic Approach," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 45(3), pages 909-938, 08. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Nalebuff, Barry & Scharfstein, David, 1987. "Testing in Models of Asymmetric Information," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 54(2), pages 265-77, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. repec:att:wimass:19898 is not listed on IDEAS
  14. Persson, Mats & Siven, Claes-Henric, 2006. "Incentive and incarceration effects in a general equilibrium model of crime," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 214-229, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Daniel L. Rubinfeld & David E.M. Sappington, 1987. "Efficient Awards and Standards of Proof in Judicial Proceedings," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(2), pages 308-315, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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