Substitution between temporary parental leave and sickness absence
AbstractThis paper studies interrelations between two benefits in the Swedish social insurance system: the sickness insurance and the temporary parental benefit. The level of compensation differs between the two benefits creating an economic incentive for parents to claim temporary parental benefit when being ill. The substitution between the two benefits is studied using a randomized experiment were parents received information that their use of the temporary parental benefit would be subject to intensified monitoring. Receiving this information decreased utilization of the temporary parental benefit but at the same time led to an increase in short-term sickness absence by 4.9 percent. This corresponds to approximately 43 percent of the decreased use of the temporary parental benefit.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy in its series Working Paper Series with number 2011:19.
Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: 14 Nov 2011
Date of revision:
Social insurance; social experiment; monitoring; moral hazard;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H30 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - General
- H51 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Health
- H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions
- I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
- J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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Journal of Human Resources,
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