Public employment and the double role of bureaucrats
AbstractBureaucrats in the government sector have a double role since they are both suppliers and demanders of public employment; they are publicly employed (supply labor) and they have an important say in deciding the size of the municipal employment (demand labor). In this paper we present and estimate a theoretical model that focuses on this double role of bureaucrats. The predictions from the theoretical model are supported by our empirical results: The estimates based on data from Swedish municipalities 1990–2002, show that wages have smaller effects on the demand for bureaucrats than on the demand for other types of public employees. Actually wages have no significant effect on the number of bureaucrats the municipality employs.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy in its series Working Paper Series with number 2004:11.
Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: 06 Sep 2004
Date of revision:
Publication status: Forthcoming in Public Choice.
Public employment; bureaucrats;
Other versions of this item:
- Dahlberg, Matz & Mörk, Eva, 2005. "Public Employment and the Double Role of Bureaucrats," Working Paper Series 2005:3, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
- J45 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Public Sector Labor Markets
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