Determinants of Trust in the European Central Bank
AbstractIn this paper we study the determinants of citizens’ trust in the European Central Bank during the start-up phase from 1999-2004. Using a country panel based on the Eurobarometer survey, we find that higher inflation rates reduce trust. Thus people appear to evaluate the performance of the ECB on the basis of its success in achieving its primary objective, namely price stability. However, national income also has a strong impact, which poses a dilemma to the ECB, as there is a general consensus among academics that monetary policy cannot increase economic growth in the long run. Unemployment does not have a significant impact on trust in the ECB, while unemployment spending exerts a trust-building impact. Possibly, automatic stabilizers serve as substitutes for ECB interventions, which would lower people’s trust. Interestingly, active labor market policies, which can be interpreted as proxies for the public’s perception of the urgency of the problem of high unemployment, tend to decrease trust.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Stockholm School of Economics in its series Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance with number 695.
Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: 19 Mar 2008
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ECB; trust; European Union; Eurobarometer; panel data; behavioral economics;
Other versions of this item:
- Justina Fischer & Volker Hahn, 2008. "Determinants of Trust in the European Central Bank," TWI Research Paper Series 26, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz.
- C33 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
- H50 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - General
- Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Social and Economic Stratification
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