AbstractWould you go to the dentist more often if it were free? Observational data is here used to analyze the impact of full-coverage insurance on dental care utilization using different identification strategies. The challenge of assessing the bite of moral hazard without an experimental study design is to separate it from adverse selection, as agents act on private and generally unobservable information. By utilizing a quasi-experimental feature of the insurance scheme the moral hazard effect is identified on observables, and by having access to an instrument the effect is identified with IV. Moral hazard is assessed using both difference-in-differences and cross-sectional estimations.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Stockholm School of Economics in its series Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance with number 642.
Length: 51 pages
Date of creation: 28 Nov 2006
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: The Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics, P.O. Box 6501, 113 83 Stockholm, Sweden
Phone: +46-(0)8-736 90 00
Fax: +46-(0)8-31 01 57
Web page: http://www.hhs.se/
More information through EDIRC
Asymmetric information; Moral Hazard; Health Insurance; Porpensity Score Matching; IV;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
- I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-12-09 (All new papers)
- NEP-HEA-2006-12-09 (Health Economics)
- NEP-IAS-2006-12-09 (Insurance Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Georges Dionne & Christian Gourieroux & Charles Vanasse, 2001. "Testing for Evidence of Adverse Selection in the Automobile Insurance Market: A Comment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(2), pages 444-473, April.
- Grönqvist, Erik, 2004. "Does Adverse Selection Matter? Evidence from a Natural Experiment," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 575, Stockholm School of Economics.
- Manning, Willard G, et al, 1987. "Health Insurance and the Demand for Medical Care: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(3), pages 251-77, June.
- Lechner, Michael, 1999. "Identification and Estimation of Causal Effects of Multiple Treatments Under the Conditional Independence Assumption," IZA Discussion Papers 91, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Heckman, James J. & Lalonde, Robert J. & Smith, Jeffrey A., 1999. "The economics and econometrics of active labor market programs," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 31, pages 1865-2097 Elsevier.
- Frank Windmeijer, 2002. "ExpEnd, A Gauss programme for non-linear GMM estimation of exponential models with endogenous regressors for cross section and panel data," CeMMAP working papers CWP14/02, Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
- Jaap H. Abbring & Pierre-André Chiappori & Jean Pinquet, 2003.
"Moral Hazard and Dynamic Insurance Data,"
Journal of the European Economic Association,
MIT Press, vol. 1(4), pages 767-820, 06.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Helena Lundin).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.