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(M)oral Hazard?

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Author Info
Grönqvist, Erik () (Dept. of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics)

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Abstract

Would you go to the dentist more often if it were free? Observational data is here used to analyze the impact of full-coverage insurance on dental care utilization using different identification strategies. The challenge of assessing the bite of moral hazard without an experimental study design is to separate it from adverse selection, as agents act on private and generally unobservable information. By utilizing a quasi-experimental feature of the insurance scheme the moral hazard effect is identified on observables, and by having access to an instrument the effect is identified with IV. Moral hazard is assessed using both difference-in-differences and cross-sectional estimations.

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File URL: http://swopec.hhs.se/hastef/papers/hastef0642.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Stockholm School of Economics in its series Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance with number 642.

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Length: 51 pages
Date of creation: 28 Nov 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:hastef:0642

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Postal: The Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics, P.O. Box 6501, 113 83 Stockholm, Sweden
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Related research
Keywords: Asymmetric information; Moral Hazard; Health Insurance; Porpensity Score Matching; IV;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies
I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Grönqvist, Erik, 2004. "Does Adverse Selection Matter? Evidence from a Natural Experiment," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 575, Stockholm School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Frank Windmeijer, 2002. "ExpEnd, A Gauss programme for non-linear GMM estimation of exponential models with endogenous regressors for cross section and panel data," CeMMAP working papers CWP14/02, Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice, Institute for Fiscal Studies. [Downloadable!]
  3. Manning, Willard G, et al, 1987. "Health Insurance and the Demand for Medical Care: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(3), pages 251-77, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Jaap H. Abbring & Pierre-Andre Chiappori, 2004. "Moral Hazard and Dynamic Insurance Data," 2004 Meeting Papers 316, Society for Economic Dynamics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Georges Dionne & Christian Gourieroux & Charles Vanasse, 2001. "Testing for Evidence of Adverse Selection in the Automobile Insurance Market: A Comment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(2), pages 444-473, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Heckman, James J. & Lalonde, Robert J. & Smith, Jeffrey A., 1999. "The economics and econometrics of active labor market programs," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 31, pages 1865-2097 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Michael Lechner, 1999. "Identification and Estimation of Causal Effects of Multiple Treatments Under the Conditional Independence Assumption," IZA Discussion Papers 91, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  8. Cardon, James H & Hendel, Igal, 2001. "Asymmetric Information in Health Insurance: Evidence from the National Medical Expenditure Survey," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(3), pages 408-27, Autumn.
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-4.


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