We study the effect of political polarization on government spending and redistribution using the dispersion of self-reported political preferences as our measure of polarization. Politically polarized countries have lower levels of redistribution and government consumption. The relationship between political polarization and the size of government is stronger in democratic countries, indicating that the effect goes through the political system. The results are robust to a large set of control variables, including GDP per capita and income inequality.
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Length: 34 pages Date of creation: 19 May 2006 Date of revision:
02 Jul 2007 Handle: RePEc:hhs:hastef:0628
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Find related papers by JEL classification: H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
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Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silane & Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, 1998.
"The Quality of Goverment,"
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Alberto Alesina & Arnaud Devleeschauwer & William Easterly & Sergio Kurlat & Romain Wacziarg, 2003.
"Fractionalization,"
NBER Working Papers
9411, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)