Strategic equivalence and bounded rationality in extensive form games
AbstractIn a large family of solution concepts for boundedly rational players --- allowing players to be imperfect optimizers, but requiring that ``better'' responses are chosen with probabilities at least as high as those of ``worse'' responses --- most of Thompson's ``inessential'' transformations for the strategic equivalence of extensive form games become far from inconsequential. Only two of the usual elementary transformations remain truly inessential: the interchange of moves, and replacing a final move by nature by simply taking expected payoffs.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Stockholm School of Economics in its series Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance with number 605.
Length: 15 pages
Date of creation: 13 Oct 2005
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Extensive form games; Quantal response equilibrium; Logit model; Strategic equivalence;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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