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Strategic equivalence and bounded rationality in extensive form games

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Author Info
Voorneveld, Mark () (Dept. of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics)
Fagraeus Lundström, Helena (Dept. of Mathematics, Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden)

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Abstract

In a large family of solution concepts for boundedly rational players --- allowing players to be imperfect optimizers, but requiring that ``better'' responses are chosen with probabilities at least as high as those of ``worse'' responses --- most of Thompson's ``inessential'' transformations for the strategic equivalence of extensive form games become far from inconsequential. Only two of the usual elementary transformations remain truly inessential: the interchange of moves, and replacing a final move by nature by simply taking expected payoffs.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Stockholm School of Economics in its series Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance with number 605.

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Length: 15 pages
Date of creation: 13 Oct 2005
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Handle: RePEc:hhs:hastef:0605

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Related research
Keywords: Extensive form games; Quantal response equilibrium; Logit model; Strategic equivalence;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Jacob K. Goeree & Charles A. Holt, 2001. "Ten Little Treasures of Game Theory and Ten Intuitive Contradictions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1402-1422, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Rosenthal, Robert W, 1989. "A Bounded-Rationality Approach to the Study of Noncooperative Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 273-91.
  3. Tversky, Amos & Kahneman, Daniel, 1986. "Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions," Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(4), pages S251-78, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Elmes Susan & Reny Philip J., 1994. "On the Strategic Equivalence of Extensive Form Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 1-23, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Mark Voorneveld, 2006. "Probabilistic Choice in Games: Properties of Rosenthal’s t-Solutions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 105-121, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Richard Mckelvey & Thomas Palfrey, 1998. "Quantal Response Equilibria for Extensive Form Games," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 9-41, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. McKelvey Richard D. & Palfrey Thomas R., 1995. "Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 6-38, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Kenneth Train, 2003. "Discrete Choice Methods with Simulation," Online economics textbooks, SUNY-Oswego, Department of Economics, number emetr2, March. [Downloadable!]
  9. Kohlberg, Elon & Mertens, Jean-Francois, 1986. "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1003-37, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Jacob Goeree & Charles Holt & Thomas Palfrey, 2005. "Regular Quantal Response Equilibrium," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 8(4), pages 347-367, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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