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Credit Claiming

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Author Info

  • Glazer, Amihai

    (Department of Economics, University of California, Irvine, USA)

  • Segendorff, Björn

    (Dept. of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics)

Abstract

We consider a leader and a subordinate he appoints who engage in team production. The public observes the organization’s performance, but is unable to determine the separate contributions of the leader and of the subordinate. The leader may therefore claim credit for the good work of his subordinate. We find conditions which induce the leader to claim credit (both truthfully and untruthfully), and the conditions which lead the leader to appoint a subordinate of low ability.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Stockholm School of Economics in its series Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance with number 0458.

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Length: 15 pages
Date of creation: 14 Aug 2001
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:hastef:0458

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Keywords: Leader; Credit claiming; asymmetric information; Equilibrium;

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Cited by:
  1. Marion Eberlein & Judith Przemeck, 2008. "Whom will you choose? - Collaborator Selection and Selector’s Self-Prediction," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, University of Bonn, Germany bgse12_2008, University of Bonn, Germany.

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