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Cooperation or Conflict in Common Pools

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  • Ternström, Ingela

    ()
    (Dept. of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics)

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    Abstract

    Many of the world's common pool resources are located in poor countries, where consumption levels may be low enough to adversely affect the users' health. Under these circumstances, an agent's utility function may be described as an S-shaped function of consumption. Using non-cooperative game theory, very poor groups of users are shown to have lower probability of cooperative management of common pool resources than groups with adequate consumption levels. However, users that are only moderately poor have the greatest chance for cooperation. For this group, if resource productivity varies, cooperation may break down in periods of low productivity. The theoretical results concur with empirical evidence of cooperation in common pool resources.

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    File URL: http://swopec.hhs.se/hastef/papers/hastef0428.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Stockholm School of Economics in its series Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance with number 0428.

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    Length: 25 pages
    Date of creation: 25 Jan 2001
    Date of revision: 16 Feb 2001
    Handle: RePEc:hhs:hastef:0428

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    Related research

    Keywords: Common pool resource; developing countries; dynamic game; irrigation; natural resource; non-linear utility;

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    Cited by:
    1. Baland, Jean-Marie & Platteau, Jean-Philippe, 2003. "Economics of common property management regimes," Handbook of Environmental Economics, Elsevier, in: K. G. Mäler & J. R. Vincent (ed.), Handbook of Environmental Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 4, pages 127-190 Elsevier.

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