Subordinates as Threats to Leaders
AbstractA leader of an organization may view a subordinate as threatening or weakening the leader's position. The threat may increase with the subordinate's ability and reduce the rents the leader wins. In particular, a leader who trains his subordinate reduces the cost to the owner of a firm in replacing the leader, and so reduces the leader's bargaining power. The leader therefore provides inefficiently low training for the subordinate.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Stockholm School of Economics in its series Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance with number 0424.
Length: 13 pages
Date of creation: 21 Jan 2001
Date of revision:
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Postal: The Economic Research Institute, Stockholm School of Economics, P.O. Box 6501, 113 83 Stockholm, Sweden
Phone: +46-(0)8-736 90 00
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Web page: http://www.hhs.se/
More information through EDIRC
Leader; Subordinate; Threat; Training; Bargaining;
Other versions of this item:
- Glazer, A. & Segendorff, B., 2000. "Subordinates as Threats to Leaders," Papers, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences 00-01-16, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
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- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
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