Analyzing Economic Market Interactions as Conflicts: New Concepts to Assess Market-Based Policy Instruments
AbstractComplementing market-based policy instruments with conflict analysis approaches provides a wider understanding of market situations and allows to identify minimal requirements regarding needs, power and conflict dynamics. If these are not met, a market cannot be successfully introduced or a liberalization process implemented. Conflict analysis offers a language better suited to the concerns of people negatively affected by new markets. Applying this language helps to counterbalance the predominance of economic concepts. This fosters mutual understanding and enhances the prospect for successful implementation of market-based policies. We illustrate the potential of conflict analysis with examples from water privatization and labeling.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers in Economics with number 212.
Length: 18 pages
Date of creation: 31 Aug 2006
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Ecological Economics, 2007, pages 81-90.
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, University of Gothenburg, Box 640, SE 405 30 GÖTEBORG, Sweden
Phone: 031-773 10 00
Web page: http://www.handels.gu.se/econ/
More information through EDIRC
market interactions; liberalization; privatization; labeling; conflict analysis; needs;
Other versions of this item:
- Mason, Simon A. & Muller, Adrian, 2007. "Analyzing economic market interactions as conflicts: New concepts to assess market-based policy instruments," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 81-90, February.
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
- H00 - Public Economics - - General - - - General
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
- L50 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-09-11 (All new papers)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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- Rothschild, Kurt W., 2002. "The absence of power in contemporary economic theory," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 433-442.
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"Does Competition Destroy Ethical Behavior?,"
NBER Working Papers
10269, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Perry, C. J. & Rock, M. & Seckler, D., 1997. "Water as an economic good: a solution, or a problem ?," IWMI Research Reports H021492, International Water Management Institute.
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