IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hhs/gunwpe/0068.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Negative Externalities in Day Care: Optimal Tax Policy Response

Author

Listed:
  • Lundholm , Michael

    (Departement of Economics)

  • Ohlsson , Henry

    (Department of Economics, School of Economics and Commercial Law, Göteborg University)

Abstract

Systematic pediatric evidence shows that the morbidity rates for children in day care are increasing in the group size.Sick children are usually cared for at home by parents. This creates a negative externality of parents' labor force participation. The social optimum implies lower group size than the non--intervention market equilibrium. We study the optimal tax policy. The cost of labor force participation should be increased. This can be done by either or both a tax on day care services and a home care allowance. The cost of providing day care should be decreased by a subsidy to entrepreneurs running day care centers. This policy will decrease the group size. It is, however, not necessarily the case that this will decrease labor force participation.

Suggested Citation

  • Lundholm , Michael & Ohlsson , Henry, 2002. "Negative Externalities in Day Care: Optimal Tax Policy Response," Working Papers in Economics 68, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0068
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2077/2835
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Henry Ohlsson & Michael Lundholm, 1998. "Wages, taxes and publicly provided day care," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 11(2), pages 185-204.
    2. Bergstrom, Ted & Blomquist, Soren, 1996. "The political economy of subsidized day care," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 443-457, November.
    3. Bergstrom, Ted & Blomquist, Soren, 1996. "The political economy of subsidized day care," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 443-457, November.
    4. Pitt, Mark M & Rosenzweig, Mark R, 1990. "Estimating the Intrahousehold Incidence of Illness: Child Health and Gender-Inequality in the Allocation of Time," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 31(4), pages 969-980, November.
    5. Blomquist, Suren & Christiansen, Vidar, 1995. " Public Provision of Private Goods as a Redistributive Device in an Optimum Income Tax Model," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 97(4), pages 547-567, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Blomquist, Soren & Christiansen, Vidar, 1999. "The political economy of publicly provided private goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 31-54, July.
    2. Sören Blömquist & Vidar Christiansen, 1998. "Price Subsidies Versus Public Provision," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 5(3), pages 283-306, July.
    3. Blomquist, Soren & Christiansen, Vidar, 1998. "Topping Up or Opting Out? The Optimal Design of Public Provision Schemes," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 39(2), pages 399-411, May.
    4. Zohal Hessami & Silke Uebelmesser, 2016. "A political-economy perspective on social expenditures: corruption and in-kind versus cash transfers," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 71-100, February.
    5. Ghazala Naz, 2004. "The impact of cash-benefit reform on parents’ labour force participation," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 17(2), pages 369-383, June.
    6. Zohal Hessami & Claudio Thum & Silke Uebelmesser, 2012. "A Political Economy Explanation for In-kind Redistribution: The Interplay of Corruption and Democracy," Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz 2012-25, Department of Economics, University of Konstanz.
    7. Blomquist, Sören & Micheletto, Luca, 2004. "Redistribution, In-Kind Transfers and Matching Grants when the Federal Government Lacks Information on Local Costs," Working Paper Series 2004:15, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
    8. Brink, Anna & Nordblom, Katarina, 2005. "Child-care quality and fee structure: Effects on labor supply and leisure composition," Working Papers in Economics 157, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
    9. Laura Mayoral & Joan Esteban, 2019. "A politico-economic model of public expenditure and income taxation," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 10(3), pages 479-507, November.
    10. Guyonne Kalb & Thor Thoresen, 2010. "A comparison of family policy designs of Australia and Norway using microsimulation models," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 255-287, June.
    11. repec:use:tkiwps:3030 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. David Domeij, 2013. "Should Day Care be Subsidized?," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 80(2), pages 568-595.
    13. Minagawa Junichi & Upmann Thorsten, 2014. "A Single Parent’s Labor Supply: Evaluating Different Child Care Fees within an Intertemporal Framework," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 14(1), pages 1-39, January.
    14. Sanghamitra Bandyopadhyay & Joan Esteban, 2009. "Redistributive Taxation, PublicExpenditure and the Size of Government," STICERD - Distributional Analysis Research Programme Papers 095, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
    15. Sanghamitra Bandyopadhyay & Joan Esteban, 2007. "Redistributive Taxation and Public Expenditures," Economics Series Working Papers 366, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    16. Bas van Groezen & L. Meijdam, 2009. "At whose service? Subsidizing services and the skill premium," Working Papers 09-30, Utrecht School of Economics.
    17. Economides, George & Philippopoulos, Apostolis & Sakkas, Stelios, 2017. "Tuition fees: User prices and private incentives," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 91-103.
    18. Henry Ohlsson & Michael Lundholm, 1998. "Wages, taxes and publicly provided day care," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 11(2), pages 185-204.
    19. Thomas Aronsson & Sören Blomquist & Luca Micheletto, 2010. "Where Should the Elderly Live and Who Should Pay for Their Care?," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 112(2), pages 289-314, June.
    20. Junichi Minagawa & Thorsten Upmann, 2006. "Labor Supply and the Demand for Child Care: An Intertemporal Approach," CESifo Working Paper Series 1819, CESifo.
    21. Thum, Claudio & Thum, Marcel, 2001. " Repeated Interaction and the Public Provision of Private Goods," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 103(4), pages 625-643, December.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    negative externalities; infections; day care centers; optimal taxation; Pigouvian taxes;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D10 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - General
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • I12 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Behavior
    • J13 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth
    • J21 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Labor Force and Employment, Size, and Structure

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hhs:gunwpe:0068. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Ann-Christin Räätäri Nyström (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/naiguse.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.