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A decisive intelligence failure? British intelligence on Soviet war potential and the 1939 Anglo-French-Soviet alliance that never was

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  • Kahn, Martin

    ()
    (Department of Economic History, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University)

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    Abstract

    In 1939 the British Government tried to assess Soviet war potential in order to know more about their potential ally, as part of the negotiations concerning an Anglo-French-Soviet alliance. British assessments of Soviet economic and military strength (and the internal stability of the Stalin regime) in this context have partly been neglected in earlier research, and it seems both that British estimates were much more off the mark than earlier supposed, and that the gross underestimation of Soviet strength in 1939 was probably a major factor in the British reluctance to enter into an anti-Hitler coalition with the USSR.

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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2077/9633
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by University of Gothenburg, Department of Economic History in its series Göteborg Papers in Economic History with number 12.

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    Length: 25 pages
    Date of creation: 07 Mar 2008
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:hhs:gunhis:0012

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    Postal: Department of Economic History, School of Business, Economics and Law, University of Gothenburg, Box 640, SE 405 30 GÖTEBORG
    Phone: 031-773 47 50
    Fax: 031-773 47 39
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    Web page: http://www.econhist.gu.se/
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    Keywords: Economic History; Soviet Union; British Intelligence; Soviet war potential; Second World War; Soviet economy; Soviet military strength; Appeasement policy; Intelligence failures;

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