Civil servants’ education and the representativeness of the bureaucracy in environmental policy-making
AbstractWe model and test the representativeness of environmental policy-making, as implied by cost-benefit analysis (CBA) results, in governmental agencies assuming that individual civil servants maximize their personal utility. Education may also influence civil servants’ behavior. The biologists in our sample have the highest valuation of environmental quality. We suspect that their training does not teach them about societal welfare maximization and that they consequently do not adjust their policy recommendation to CBA results, while the economists, who learn about welfare economics, do. The empirical results indicate that the economists adjust their private valuation of the environment by a factor giving a sufficient weight to the CBA results to make their average choice a cost-efficient one. Even the economists in our sample chose on average a policy that is costlier than the cost-efficient one yet clearly less expensive than the policy chosen by the biologists and social scientists.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CTS - Centre for Transport Studies Stockholm (KTH and VTI) in its series Working papers in Transport Economics with number 2013:30.
Length: 36 pages
Date of creation: 08 Oct 2013
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Centrum för Transportstudier (CTS), Teknikringen 10, 100 44 Stockholm, Sweden
Web page: http://www.kth.se/abe/om_skolan/organisation/centra/cts
Biologists; Bureaucracy; Civil servants; Education; Economists; Environmental policy; Political Economics; Representative bureaucracy; Surveys; Use of cost-benefit analysis; Weighted welfare;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
- H83 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Public Administration
- Q25 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Water
- Q53 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Air Pollution; Water Pollution; Noise; Hazardous Waste; Solid Waste; Recycling
- Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-10-18 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENV-2013-10-18 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-RES-2013-10-18 (Resource Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Aghion, Philippe & Tirole, Jean, 1997.
"Formal and Real Authority in Organizations,"
4554125, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Aghion, Philippe & Tirole, Jean, 1994. "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations," IDEI Working Papers 37, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Philippe Aghion & Jean Tirole, 1994. "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations," Working papers 95-8, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Philippe Aghion & Jean Tirole, 1994. "Normal and Real Authority in Organizations," Working papers 94-13, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Carlsson, Fredrik & Kataria, Mitesh & Lampi, Elina, 2008.
"Do EPA administrators recommend environmental policies that citizens want?,"
Working Papers in Economics
297, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
- Fredrik Carlsson & Mitesh Kataria & Elina Lampi, 2011. "Do EPA Administrators Recommend Environmental Policies That Citizens Want?," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 87(1), pages 60-74.
- Fredrik Carlsson & Mitesh Kataria & Elina Lampi, 2009. "Do EPA administrators recommend environmental policies that citizens want?," Jena Economic Research Papers 2009-057, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Mats Berggren).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.