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Empirical analysis of moral hazard: a study of a vehicle insurance tax reform

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    Abstract

    This paper uses discrete choice and count data models to analyze the effects of a tax on vehicle insurance levied in Sweden in 2007. The analysis is based on a large set of micro-level panel data on individual insurance holders at the largest insurance company in Sweden for the period 2006-2010. Two questions are addressed: How did the tax reform influence the choice of insurance coverage, and how did changes in coverage affect the incidence of claims? The results show that, on average, the tax reform increased the odds of choosing lower insurance coverage by 47 percent, and that the tax reform had more impact on older drivers. However, switching to lower coverage due to the tax reform has not resulted in significant changes in claim distributions, though the incidence of claims decreased by 20 percent for switchers aged 35-44 in the pre-reform period, indicating a mitigation of ex ante moral hazard in vehicle insurance.

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    File URL: http://www.transportportal.se/swopec/CTS2013-14.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by CTS - Centre for Transport Studies Stockholm (KTH and VTI) in its series Working papers in Transport Economics with number 2013:14.

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    Length: 46 pages
    Date of creation: 19 Sep 2013
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:hhs:ctswps:2013_014

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    Postal: Centrum för Transportstudier (CTS), Teknikringen 10, 100 44 Stockholm, Sweden
    Web page: http://www.kth.se/abe/om_skolan/organisation/centra/cts

    Related research

    Keywords: Vehicle insurance; Moral hazard; Traffic safety; Tax reform;

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    1. Dionne, G. & Michaud, P.C. & Dahchour, M., 2004. "Separating Moral Hazard from Adverse Selection in Automobile Insurance: Longitudinal Evidence from France," Discussion Paper 2004-79, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    2. Jaap H. Abbring & Pierre-Andre Chiappori, 2004. "Moral Hazard and Dynamic Insurance Data," 2004 Meeting Papers 316, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    3. Dionne, Georges & Gagne, Robert, 2002. " Replacement Cost Endorsement and Opportunistic Fraud in Automobile Insurance," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 24(3), pages 213-30, May.
    4. Chu-Shiu Li & Chwen-Chi Liu & Jia-Hsing Yeh, 2007. "The Incentive Effects of Increasing Per-Claim Deductible Contracts in Automobile Insurance," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 74(2), pages 441-459.
    5. Georges Dionne & Christian Gourieroux & Charles Vanasse, 1997. "The Informational Content of Household Decisions," Working Papers 97-01, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique.
    6. Kuniyoshi Saito, 2006. "Testing for Asymmetric Information in the Automobile Insurance Market Under Rate Regulation," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 73(2), pages 335-356.
    7. Eric Zivot & Donald W.K. Andrews, 1990. "Further Evidence on the Great Crash, the Oil Price Shock, and the Unit Root Hypothesis," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 944, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    8. Rothschild, Michael & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 630-49, November.
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