Does Coordination of Immigration Policies among Destination Countries Increase Immigration?
AbstractWe set up a theoretical model to analyze the implications of coordination of immigration policies among destination countries. The model contains two types of spill-overs between destination countries: A terms of trade externality and a welfare policy externality. We show that while coordination unambiguously increases welfare of the destination countries, the effects on the level of immigration and on the income distribution of natives are ambiguous. Thus, coordination among destination countries does not necessarily solve the global coordination problem of inoptimally low levels of migration. Coordination, Externalities, Immigration Policy, Spill-overs, Terms of Trade, Welfare.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 15-2007.
Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: 01 Jan 2007
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Postal: Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School, Solbjerg Plads 3 C, 5. sal, DK-2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark
Phone: 38 15 25 75
Fax: 38 15 26 65
Web page: http://www.cbs.dk/departments/econ/
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Other versions of this item:
- Claus Aastrup Jensen & Nikolaj Malchow-M�ller & Jan Rose Skaksen, 2010. "Does coordination of immigration policies among destination countries increase immigration?," Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 19(3), pages 357-384.
- G10 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - General (includes Measurement and Data)
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- Slobodan Djajic & Michael S. Michael, 2009. "Temporary Migration Policies and Welfare of the Host and Source Countries: A Game-Theoretic Approach," CESifo Working Paper Series 2811, CESifo Group Munich.
- David de la CROIX & Frederic DOCQUIER, 2009.
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Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales)
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- David de la Croix & Frederic Docquier, 2010. "An Incentive Mechanism to Break the Low-skill Immigration Deadlock," CReAM Discussion Paper Series 1008, Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration (CReAM), Department of Economics, University College London.
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