Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

• Christian Schultz

Download Info

To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

Publisher Info

Paper provided by Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 08-2003.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: 01 Jul 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:cbsnow:2003_008

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School, Solbjerg Plads 3 C, 5. sal, DK-2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark
Phone: 38 15 25 75
Fax: 38 15 26 65
Email:
Web page: http://www.cbs.dk/departments/econ/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Lars Nondal).

Related research

Keywords: Incomplete contracting; Trial and error; Outsourcing; Procurement;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Boundaries of Public and Private Enterprise; Privatization; Contracting Out
L97 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Utilities: General

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

1. Hart, Oliver & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997. "The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1127-61, November.
   Other versions:
   • Oliver Hart & Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, 1996. "The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1778, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
   • Oliver Hart & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1996. "The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons," NBER Working Papers 5744, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Andrei Shleifer, 1998. "State Versus Private Ownership," NBER Working Papers 6665, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Andrei Shleifer, 1998. "State Versus Private Ownership," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1841, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
   • Shleifer, Andrei, 1998. "State versus Private Ownership," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 133-50, Fall. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Aghion, Philippe & Tirole, Jean, 1997. "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 1-29, February.
   Other versions:
   • Aghion, Philippe & Tirole, Jean, 1994. "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations," IDEI Working Papers 37, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
   • Philippe Aghion & Jean Tirole, 1994. "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations," Working papers 95-8, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
   • Philippe Aghion & Jean Tirole, 1994. "Normal and Real Authority in Organizations," Working papers 94-13, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
4. Bennedsen, Morten & Schultz, Christian, 2003. "Outsourcing, Market Structure and Elections," Working Papers 07-2003, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Morten Bennedsen & Christian Schultz, 2003. "Outsourcing, Market Structure and Elections," CIE Discussion Papers 2003-05, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics. [Downloadable!]
5. Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, 1997. "Privatization in the United States," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 28(3), pages 447-471, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Florencio Lopez-de-Silane & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1995. "Privatization in the United States," NBER Working Papers 5113, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   • Florencio Lopez-deSilanes & Andrei Shleifer & Rober Vishny, 1995. "Privatization in the United States," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1723, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
6. Hart, Oliver D & Tirole, Jean, 1988. "Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 55(4), pages 509-40, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Oliver D. Hart & Jean Tirole, 1987. "Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics," Working papers 442, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
7. Boycko, Maxim & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1996. "A Theory of Privatisation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 106(435), pages 309-19, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Bennedsen, Morten, 1999. "Political Ownership," Working Papers 11-1999, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
9. John Vickers & George Yarrow, 1988. "Privatization: An Economic Analysis," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262720116, December.
10. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1988. "The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(5), pages 1153-75, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1985. "The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts," Working papers 397, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
11. Smith, Vernon L, 1982. "Microeconomic Systems as an Experimental Science," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(5), pages 923-55, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
12. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1994. "Politicians and Firms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 109(4), pages 995-1025, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
13. Klaus M. Schmidt, 1990. "The Costs and Benefits of Privatization," Discussion Paper Serie A 287, University of Bonn, Germany.
    Other versions:
    • Schmidt,Klaus M., 1991. "The costs and benefits of privatization," Discussion Paper Serie A 330, University of Bonn, Germany.
14. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1991. "Privatization and Incentives," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 84-105, Special I.
    Other versions:
    • Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Privatization and Incentives," Working papers 572, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Did you know? All top Economics journals are listed on RePEc.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-17.