Competition compliance: limits to competition policy harmonisation in EU enlargement
AbstractThe paper analyses the extent of and the reasons behind limits to competition policy harmonisation in EU enlargement. Our focus is on vertical restraints. First, we compare the relevant legal regimes towards vertical agreements in the EU and in Eastern Europe. We then describe competition policy practice in all ten EU candidate countries and point out differences both between East and West and among the candidates. Finally, we examine a large database of inter-firm agreements in Eastern Europe’s car industry and use insights from case studies of subcontracting to highlight instances of non-conformity between (1) East European competition law and practice and (2) EU rules and East European competition law enforcement. The conclusion recommends how to improve competition policy practice, and thus compliance, postenlargement.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 11-2002.
Length: 15 pages
Date of creation: 01 Sep 2002
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School, Solbjerg Plads 3 C, 5. sal, DK-2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark
Phone: 38 15 25 75
Fax: 38 15 34 99
Web page: http://www.cbs.dk/departments/econ/
More information through EDIRC
Competition policy; vertical restraints; vertical agreements; Eastern Europe; EU harmonisation; subcontracting; competition law;
Other versions of this item:
- Jochen Lorentzen & H. Peter Møllgaard, 2002. "Competition Compliance: Limits to Competition Policy Harmonisation in EU Enlargement," CIE Discussion Papers 2002-11, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
- D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - General
- G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- K00 - Law and Economics - - General - - - General (including Data Sources and Description)
- K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
- L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2003-04-13 (All new papers)
- NEP-EEC-2003-04-13 (European Economics)
- NEP-LAW-2003-04-13 (Law & Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Anna Fornalczyk, 2002. "The enforcement of competition policy in the candidate countries," Intereconomics: Review of European Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 37(1), pages 52-58, January.
- Djankov, Simeon & Hoekman, Bernard, 1997. "Competition Law in Post-Central Planning Bulgaria," CEPR Discussion Papers 1723, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Dutz, Mark A. & Vagliasindi, Maria, 2000. "Competition policy implementation in transition economies: An empirical assessment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(4-6), pages 762-772, May.
- Klein, Benjamin & Crawford, Robert G & Alchian, Armen A, 1978. "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 297-326, October.
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