While examining the macroeconomic effects of increased government
control of the informal sector, this paper develops a two-sector general
equilibrium model featuring matching frictions on the labour market and
a social norm. Conducting informal work, or employing a worker infor-
mally, is associated with expected punishment fees and payments of a
moral cost, given that there is a social norm against tax evasion. This
framework facilitates an analysis of how wage setting, unemployment and
the size of the informal sector are affected by punishment policies, which
has been ignored in the previous literature. Furthermore, the inclusion of
an endogenously determined norm against tax evasion may explain differences in-between regions or countries in relative sizes of the formal and the informal sectors for similar tax- and punishment policies.
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number
04-2002.
Length: 24 pages Date of creation: 01 May 2002 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:hhs:cbsnow:2002_004
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