Why do firms have boards?
AbstractIn a world where corporate boards are not required by law, I identify a governance and a distribute motive for board establishment and board composition. I investigate the presence of these motives in a sample of 23.000+ closely held corporations. Board frequency increases with more owners, if control is diluted and in larger firms. Given firms have a board, non-controlling owners are more likely to be on the board when controlling owners are more powerful. Finally, consistent with an equilibrium interpretation of strategic board establishment, I find little effect of the presence of boards on performance. I conclude that both motives are significant and discuss related corporate governance implications.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 03-2002.
Length: 42 pages
Date of creation: 01 Mar 2002
Date of revision:
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Postal: Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School, Solbjerg Plads 3 C, 5. sal, DK-2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark
Phone: 38 15 25 75
Fax: 38 15 26 65
Web page: http://www.cbs.dk/departments/econ/
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Boards; governance; distributive conflicts; ultimate ownership;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2002-04-03 (All new papers)
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- Bennedsen, Morten & Kongsted, Hans Christian & Nielsen, Kasper Meisner, 2008. "The causal effect of board size in the performance of small and medium-sized firms," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 32(6), pages 1098-1109, June.
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