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NONCOOPERATIVE vs MINIMUM-RATE COMMODITY TAXATION

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Author Info

  • Hvidt, Morten

    (University of Copenhagen)

  • Nielsen, Søren Bo

    (University of Copenhagen)

Abstract

This paper demonstrates, within a simple two-country model of commodity taxation and cross-border shopping, that the tax revenue (welfare) effects of a minimum tax requirement depend crucially on the character of the initial noncooperative tax equilibrium, i.e. whether it is Nash or Stackelberg.

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File URL: http://openarchive.cbs.dk/cbsweb/handle/10398/7644
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 17-2000.

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Length: 16 pages
Date of creation: 09 Oct 2000
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:cbsnow:2000_017

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Postal: Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School, Solbjerg Plads 3 C, 5. sal, DK-2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark
Phone: 38 15 25 75
Fax: 38 15 34 99
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Web page: http://www.cbs.dk/departments/econ/
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Keywords: Commodity tax; Minimum rate;

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References

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  1. Mintz, J. & Tulkens, H., 1984. "Commodity tax competition between member states of a federation: equilibrium and efficiency," CORE Discussion Papers, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) 1984027, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  2. Andreas Haufler, 1996. "Tax coordination with different preferences for public goods: Conflict or harmony of interest?," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 5-28, January.
  3. You-Qiang Wang, 1999. "Commodity Taxes under Fiscal Competition: Stackelberg Equilibrium and Optimality," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 89(4), pages 974-981, September.
  4. Ravi Kanbur & Michael Keen, 1991. "Jeux Sans Frontieres: Tax Competition and Tax Coordination when Countries Differ in Size," Working Papers, Queen's University, Department of Economics 819, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  5. Trandel, Gregory A., 1994. "Interstate commodity tax differentials and the distribution of residents," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 435-457, March.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Nielsen, Soren Bo, 2002. "Cross-border shopping from small to large countries," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 77(3), pages 309-313, November.
  2. Konrad, Kai A., 2008. "Non-binding minimum taxes may foster tax competition," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2008-10, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
  3. Vidar Christiansen, . "Cross-border shopping and tax structure," EPRU Working Paper Series, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics 03-04, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.

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