AbstractPolitical involvement in the operation of an enterprise, whether it is private or state owned, creates opportunities for interest groups to influence the allocation of resources. Resource allocation transfers rent both between unions and private owners within the firm and between these organized insiders and the disorganized taxpayers. I investigate how insiders`lobby activities distorts resource allocation in a state owned enterprise. Then I show that efficiency in labor allocation is improved when cash flow is rights affects efficiency in resource allocation when there are restrictions on side payments between the interest groups.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 11-1999.
Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: 18 Jul 1999
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School, Solbjerg Plads 3 C, 5. sal, DK-2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark
Phone: 38 15 25 75
Fax: 38 15 34 99
Web page: http://www.cbs.dk/departments/econ/
More information through EDIRC
Ownership Structure; Influence Externality; Side Payments; resource Allocation;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
- L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprise and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2001-07-23 (All new papers)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1994. "Politicians and Firms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 109(4), pages 995-1025, November.
- John Vickers & George Yarrow, 1988. "Privatization: An Economic Analysis," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262720116, January.
- Andrei Shleifer, 1998.
"State Versus Private Ownership,"
Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers
1841, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1996.
"Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(2), pages 265-86, April.
- Gene Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 1994. "Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics," NBER Working Papers 4877, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1991.
"Privatization and Incentives,"
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization,
Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 84-105, Special I.
- Dixit, Avinash & Grossman, Gene M. & Helpman, Elhanan, 1997.
"Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making,"
3450061, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Dixit, Avinash & Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1997. "Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(4), pages 752-69, August.
- Hart, Oliver & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997.
"The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
MIT Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1127-61, November.
- Oliver Hart & Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, 1996. "The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1778, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Oliver Hart & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1996. "The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons," NBER Working Papers 5744, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Blanchard, O. & Aghion, P., 1996. "On insider privatization," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-5), pages 759-766, April.
- Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1992.
"Protection for Sale,"
162, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
- Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1992. "Protection for Sale," Papers 21-92, Tel Aviv.
- Grossman, Gene & Helpman, Elhanan, 1993. "Protection for Sale," CEPR Discussion Papers 827, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 1992. "Protection For Sale," NBER Working Papers 4149, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Schmidt, Klaus M, 1996. "The Costs and Benefits of Privatization: An Incomplete Contracts Approach," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 12(1), pages 1-24, April.
- Aghion, Philippe & Blanchard, Olivier & Burgess, Robin, 1994. "The behaviour of state firms in eastern Europe, pre-privatisation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(6), pages 1327-1349, June.
- Tirole, Jean, 1991. "Collusion and the Theory of Organizations," IDEI Working Papers 9, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Roman Frydman & Andrzej Rapaczynski, 1993. "Insiders and the state: overview of responses to agency problems in East European privatizations," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 1(1), pages 39-59, 01.
- Patrick Bolton, 1995. "Privatization and the separation of ownership and control: lessons from Chinese enterprise reform," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 3(1), pages 1-11, 03.
- Olivier Debande & Guido Friebel, 1997. "Privatization and Managerial Efficiency," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 39, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
- E. Markou & C. Waddams Price, 1999. "UK utilities: Past reform and current proposals," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 70(3), pages 371-416, 09.
- Boycko, Maxim & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1996. "A Theory of Privatisation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 106(435), pages 309-19, March.
- Persson, Torsten, 1998. "Economic Policy and Special Interest Politics," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(447), pages 310-27, March.
- Bennedsen, Morten & Schultz, Christian, 2003. "Adaptive Contracting," Working Papers 08-2003, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics.
- Morten Bennedsen & Christian Schultz, 2003.
"Outsourcing, Market Structure and Elections,"
CIE Discussion Papers
2003-05, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Lars Nondal).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.