Rose, Caspar (Department of Finance, Copenhagen Business School)
Abstract
This paper tests the hypothesis that the threat of a contested
takeover improves corporate performance. This is done by a cross-sectional
analysis of listed Danish firms with and without effective takeover defenses.
Takeover defenses adopted by Danish firms mainly consist of dual class
voting rights often in combination with foundation ownership. Using
simultaneous equation estimation to deal with the problem of causation, the
results show that unprotected firms do not outperform protected firms. This
suggests that management in unprotected firms are disciplined by other
corporate governance mechanisms than the market for corporate control,
including the legal protection of shareholders.
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Copenhagen Business School, Department of Finance in its series Working Papers with number
2001-4.
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