The effect of lenders’ credit risk transfer activities on borrowing firms’ equity returns
AbstractAlthough innovative credit risk transfer techniques help to allocate risk more optimally, policymakers worry that they may detrimentally affect the effort spent by financial intermediaries in screening and mo-nitoring credit exposures. This paper examines the equity market’s response to loan announcements. In common with the literature it reports a significantly positive average excess return – the well known ‘bank certification’ effect. However, if the lending bank is known to actively manage its credit risk ex-posure through large-scale securitization programmes, the magnitude of the effect falls by two thirds. The equity market does not appear to place any value on news of loans extended by banks that are known to transfer credit risk off their books.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Bank of Finland in its series Research Discussion Papers with number 31/2006.
Length: 33 pages
Date of creation: 12 Dec 2006
Date of revision:
bank loans; credit derivatives; bank certification;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-02-10 (All new papers)
- NEP-BAN-2007-02-10 (Banking)
- NEP-CFN-2007-02-10 (Corporate Finance)
- NEP-FMK-2007-02-10 (Financial Markets)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Alan D. Morrison, 2005. "Credit Derivatives, Disintermediation, and Investment Decisions," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(2), pages 621-648, March.
- Chiesa, Gabriella, 2008.
"Optimal credit risk transfer, monitored finance, and banks,"
Journal of Financial Intermediation,
Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 464-477, October.
- Gabriella Chiesa, 2008. "Optimal Credit Risk Transfer, Monitored Finance, and Banks," EIEF Working Papers Series 0811, Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF), revised Sep 2008.
- Billett, Matthew T & Flannery, Mark J & Garfinkel, Jon A, 1995. " The Effect of Lender Identity on a Borrowing Firm's Equity Return," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 50(2), pages 699-718, June.
- Goderis, B.V.G. & Marsh, I. & Vall Castello, J. & Wagner, W.B., 2006.
"Bank Behavior with Access to Credit Risk Transfer Markets,"
2006-100, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Goderis, Benedikt & Marsh, Ian & Vall Castello , Judit & Wagner, Wolf, 2007. "Bank behaviour with access to credit risk transfer markets," Research Discussion Papers 4/2007, Bank of Finland.
- Minton, Bernadette A. & Stulz, Rene M. & Williamson, Rohan, 2005.
"How Much Do Banks Use Credit Derivatives to Reduce Risk?,"
Working Paper Series
2005-17, Ohio State University, Charles A. Dice Center for Research in Financial Economics.
- Bernadette A. Minton & René Stulz & Rohan Williamson, 2005. "How Much Do Banks Use Credit Derivatives to Reduce Risk?," NBER Working Papers 11579, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- James, Christopher, 1987. "Some evidence on the uniqueness of bank loans," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 217-235, December.
- Cebenoyan, A. Sinan & Strahan, Philip E., 2004. "Risk management, capital structure and lending at banks," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 19-43, January.
- Peter M. DeMarzo, 2005. "The Pooling and Tranching of Securities: A Model of Informed Intermediation," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 18(1), pages 1-35.
- Dahiya, Sandeep & Puri, Manju & Saunders, Anthony, 2001. "Bank Borrowers and Loan Sales: New Evidence on the Uniqueness of Bank Loans," Research Papers 1746, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
- Alan Morrison, 2000. "Credit Derivatives, Disintermediation and Investment Decisions," OFRC Working Papers Series 2001fe01, Oxford Financial Research Centre.
- Christopher James & David C. Smith, 2000. "Are Banks Still Special? New Evidence on Their Role in the Corporate Capital-Raising Process," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 13(1), pages 52-63.
- Massimiliano Affinito & Edoardo Tagliaferri, 2010. "Why do (or did?) banks securitize their loans? Evidence from Italy," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 741, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
- Nijskens, Rob & Wagner, Wolf, 2011. "Credit risk transfer activities and systemic risk: How banks became less risky individually but posed greater risks to the financial system at the same time," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(6), pages 1391-1398, June.
- Bernadette Minton & René Stulz & Rohan Williamson, 2009.
"How Much Do Banks Use Credit Derivatives to Hedge Loans?,"
Journal of Financial Services Research,
Springer, vol. 35(1), pages 1-31, February.
- Minton, Bernadette & Stulz, Rene & Williamson, Rohan, 2008. "How Much Do Banks Use Credit Derivatives to Hedge Loans?," Working Paper Series 2008-1, Ohio State University, Charles A. Dice Center for Research in Financial Economics.
- Norden, Lars & Wagner, Wolf, 2008.
"Credit derivatives and loan pricing,"
Journal of Banking & Finance,
Elsevier, vol. 32(12), pages 2560-2569, December.
- Norden, Lars & Silva Buston, Consuelo & Wagner, Wolf, 2014. "Financial innovation and bank behavior: Evidence from credit markets," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 130-145.
- Affinito, Massimiliano & Tagliaferri, Edoardo, 2010. "Why do (or did?) banks securitize their loans? Evidence from Italy," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 6(4), pages 189-202, December.
- Maskara, Pankaj K. & Mullineaux, Donald J., 2011. "Information asymmetry and self-selection bias in bank loan announcement studies," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 101(3), pages 684-694, September.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Minna Nyman).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.