In this study, the interaction between the competition-cooperation nexus and regulation in retail payment systems is analysed by applying the main lessons from the theory of network industries. This is justifiable on the grounds that the payment systems industry inherently has many characteristics in common with network industries. On the other hand, since the provision of payment services also has many special characteristics, the regulatory tools commonly used in many other network industries cannot be applied directly. In general, the main role of payment system regulators is to provide a level playing field for different service providers. To secure dynamic efficiency, the regulators also need to ensure adequate incentives for innovation and investment. In this respect, it is important that they do not take too restrictive an attitude towards cooperation among payment service providers. In addition to general policy analysis, the study also analyses developments in the European retail payment system field and the roles and aims of market participants.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Find related papers by JEL classification: D49 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Other G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation L98 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Government Policy
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)