Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

The Value of Publishing Official Central Bank Forecasts

Contents:

Author Info

  • Tarkka, Juha

    ()
    (Bank of Finland)

  • Mayes, David

    ()
    (Bank of Finland)

Abstract

The aim of the present analysis is to shed light on the question whether Central Banks should publish their macroeconomic forecasts, and what could possibly be gained in monetary policy if they did so. We show that disclosing the Central Bank’s assessment of the prevailing inflationary pressures in the form of a forecast improves macroeconomic performance even if this assessment is imprecise. This is because it makes policy more predictable. We are also interested in finding out the useful content of the forecasts, if published, and answering the question whether it makes a difference if these official forecasts are “unconditional” in the sense of incorporating the Central Bank’s forecasts of its own policy as well, or “conditional” on some other policy assumption. Possible conditional alternatives may include assuming unchanged instruments, however specified, or assuming the kind of policy that the private sector is estimated to expect. The analysis comes out in favour of publishing unconditional forecasts, which reveal the intended results of monetary policy. A discussion of some practical issues related to publishing official macroeconomic forecasts is also provided.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.suomenpankki.fi/en/julkaisut/tutkimukset/keskustelualoitteet/Documents/9922.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Bank of Finland in its series Research Discussion Papers with number 22/1999.

as in new window
Length: 42 pages
Date of creation: 31 Dec 1999
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:bofrdp:1999_022

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Bank of Finland, P.O. Box 160, FI-00101 Helsinki, Finland
Web page: http://www.suomenpankki.fi/en/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: forecasting; transparency; monetary policy; central banks;

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Mark Gertler & Jordi Gali & Richard Clarida, 1999. "The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(4), pages 1661-1707, December.
  2. David Mayes & Bryan Chapple, 1995. "The costs and benefits of disinflation: a critique of the sacrifice ration," Reserve Bank of New Zealand Bulletin, Reserve Bank of New Zealand, vol. 58, March.
  3. Jon Faust & Lars E. O. Svensson, 1998. "Transparency and Credibility: Monetary Policy with Unobservable Goals," NBER Working Papers 6452, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Matthew B. Canzoneri, 1983. "Monetary policy games and the role of private information," International Finance Discussion Papers 249, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  5. Backus, David & Driffill, John, 1985. "Inflation and Reputation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(3), pages 530-38, June.
  6. Alexei Onatski & James H. Stock, 1999. "Robust monetary policy under model uncertainty in a small model of the U.S. economy," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
  7. Kenneth N. Kuttner & Adam S. Posen, 1999. "Does talk matter after all? Inflation targeting and central bank behavior," Staff Reports 88, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
  8. Andrew Levin & Volker Wieland & John C. Williams, 1998. "Robustness of simple monetary policy rules under model uncertainty," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 1998-45, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  9. Marvin Goodfriend, 1985. "Monetary mystique : secrecy and central banking," Working Paper 85-07, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
  10. Palmqvist, Stefan, 1999. "Why Central Banks Announce their Objectives: Monetary Policy with Discretionary Signalling," Seminar Papers 663, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
  11. Svensson, Lars E.O., 1997. "Inflation Targeting: Some Extensions," Seminar Papers 625, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
  12. Palmqvist, Stefan, 1999. "Why Central Banks Announce Their Objectives: Monetary Policy with Discretionary Signalling," Working Paper Series 78, Sveriges Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden).
  13. McCallum, Bennett T, 1995. "Two Fallacies Concerning Central-Bank Independence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(2), pages 207-11, May.
  14. Palmqvist, S., 1999. "Why Central Banks Announce their Objectives: Monetary Policy with Discretionary Signalling," Papers 663, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
  15. Athanasios Orphanides, 1998. "Monetary policy evaluation with noisy information," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 1998-50, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  16. Walsh, Carl E, 1995. "Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 150-67, March.
  17. Frederic S. Mishkin & Adam S. Posen, 1997. "Inflation targeting: lessons from four countries," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Aug, pages 9-110.
  18. Joe Peek & Eric S. Rosengren & Geoffrey M.B. Tootell, 1997. "Is banking supervision central to central banking?," Working Papers 97-3, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
  19. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
  20. Mayes, David G. & Razzak, W. A., 1998. "Transparency and accountability: Empirical models and policy making at the Reserve Bank of New Zealand," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 377-394, July.
  21. Aaron Drew & Ben Hunt, 1998. "The Forecasting and Policy System: stochastic simulations of the core model," Reserve Bank of New Zealand Discussion Paper Series G98/6, Reserve Bank of New Zealand.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hhs:bofrdp:1999_022. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Minna Nyman).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.